A waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code signed by the arrested person so he can avail of a preliminary investigation allows the authorities to detain a person arrested without a warrant beyond the periods specified under Article 125 within which they are required to deliver a person arrested without warrant to the proper judicial authorities. But how long should the preliminary investigation be conducted for the waiver to be effective? Does the execution of the waiver by the accused a license for authorities to indefinitely incarcerate an accused?
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in representation of Jay-Ar Senin, a detainee who executed a waiver of detention under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, after being arrested for violation of Republic Act 9165, whose case was dismissed by the public prosecutor, but his release was held in abeyance in view of the DOJ circular which mandates that all dismissal of drugs cases by the public prosecutors shall be subject to automatic review by the DOJ Secretary, filed petition for habeas corpus to assail the constitutionality of the different DOJ circulars which mandated the continued detention of persons who executed waivers of detention under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code while their case undergo the automatic review of the DOJ Secretary. Specifically, they assail DOJ Circular No. 12 Series of 2012, which call for automatic review for not more than 30 days all dismissal of cases under RA 9165 punished by reclusion perpetual or life imprisonment; D.C. No. 22, series of 2013, entitled Guidelines on the Release of Respondents/Accused Pending Automatic Review of Dismissed Cases Involving Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165; and D.C. No. 50, series of 2012, entitled Additional Guidelines on the Application of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended (RPC).
For the IBP, it is the height of injustice that a detainee should be placed in detention without any charges being filed against them while they await the decision on the automatic review of their cases by the DOJ Secretary.
While the petition was pending, the dismissal of Senin-s case was reversed, and an information filed against him; the IBP however prayed that the petition not be dismissed for mootness, as the same is capable of repetition in view of the different enactments made by the DOJ.
On December 18, 2015, D.C. No. 50 was issued by then Secretary of Justice (SOJ), now Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa of this Court. In brief, D.C. No. 50 stated that a person with a pending case for automatic review before the DOJ shall be released immediately if the review is not resolved within a period of 30 days
The Issue:
Whether or not the petition is mooted.
Whether or not a waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code constitute a license for the indefinite detention of accused while their case is being heard by the Department of Justice.
The Ruling:
History of the DOJ Issuances
D.C. No. 46, dated June 26, 2003
The process of automatic review of dismissed drug cases was first instituted in 2003.
Due to numerous complaints about illegal drug cases being whitewashed or dismissed due to sloppy police work, former SOJ Simeon Datumanong issued D.C. No. 46, empowering the DOJ to automatically review dismissed cases filed in violation of R.A. No. 9165 and involving the maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death.
The circular also applied to cases which had been dismissed prior to its issuance if such dismissal had not yet attained finality as of the date of the circular.
D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012
D.C. No. 46 was followed by D.C. No. 12 in which former SOJ Leila M. De Lima, for the most part, reiterated the provisions of the first circular but added that automatic review of dismissed drug cases shall be without prejudice to the right of the respondent to be immediately released from detention pending automatic review, unless respondent is detained for other causes.
D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013
A year after, SOJ De Lima revised the guidelines directing the continued detention of some respondents accused of violating R.A. No. 9165. She reasoned that cases, where the maximum imposable penalty reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, are presumably high-priority drug cases whose alleged perpetrators should remain in custody.
In this circular, the only respondents who may be released, pending automatic review of their cases by the SOJ, are those whose cases were dismissed during inquest proceedings on the ground that the arrest was not a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or that no probable cause exists to charge respondents in court.
The respondents shall remain in custody, pending automatic review of the dismissal of their cases, in the following instances as provided for under the circular:
- When during inquest proceedings, respondent elects to avail of a regular preliminary investigation and waives in writing the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC;
- When an information is filed in court after inquest proceedings and the accused is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of a regular preliminary investigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the handling prosecutor shall insist that the accused shall remain in the custody of the law pending automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ and the corresponding motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by the court;
- When an information is filed in court after preliminary investigation proceedings and the accused is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of reinvestigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the accused shall remain in custody of the law pending automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ and the corresponding motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by the court; and
- When the case against respondent is dismissed after due reinvestigation, if the case was commenced as an inquest case but was converted to a regular preliminary investigation after respondent elected the same and waived the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC.
D.C. No. 50, dated December 18, 2015
In order to address the problem of delay in the disposition of cases subject to automatic review and the prolonged detention of drug suspects without any case filed against them, then SOJ Caguioa issued D.C. No. 50, directing all heads of prosecution offices to immediately issue corresponding release orders in favor of respondents whose cases are still pending automatic review before the SOJ beyond the 30-day period prescribed in the subject circular, unless respondents are detained for some other causes.
D.C No. 003, dated January 13, 2016
In view of the considerable number of petitions for habeas corpus filed against the DOJ by accused languishing in jail for years while their cases were pending automatic review by the DOJ, then SOJ Caguioa revoked D.C. No. 50 dated December 18, 2015 and D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013.
SOJ Caguioa then reinstated D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012, mandating immediate release of respondents pending automatic review, unless respondents are detained for other causes.
D.C. No. 004, dated January 4, 2017
SOJ Vitaliano Aguirre, in this latest circular, reiterated the provisions of D.C. No. 3, dated January 13, 2016, in so far as it orders the respondent/s to be immediately released from detention, pending automatic review, unless detained for other causes.
Petition is moot and academic
The Court agrees with the OSG that this controversy has become moot and academic. First, the DOJ already issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017, which recognizes the right of a detainee to be released even if the dismissal of the case on preliminary investigation is the subject of automatic review by the SOJ. Second, records show that the order of dismissal was reversed; that upon filing of the information with the court, there was judicial determination of probable cause against Senin; and that following such judicial determination, the court issued a warrant of arrest and a commitment order.
The rule pertaining to pre-trial
detainees whose cases are under
preliminary investigation, or
whose cases have been dismissed
on inquest, preliminary
investigation but pending appeal,
motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic
review
Although the latest circular of Secretary Aguirre is laudable as it adheres to the constitutional provisions on the rights of pre-trial detainees, the Court will not dismiss the case on the ground of mootness. As can be gleaned from the ever-changing DOJ circulars, there is a possibility that the latest circular would again be amended by succeeding secretaries. It has been repeatedly held that “the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.All four (4) requisites are present in this case.
As the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes, the Court, as the guardian and final arbiter of the Constitutionand pursuant to its prerogative to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, takes this opportunity to lay down controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public on the propriety of the continued detention of an arrested person whose case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation, reinvestigation, or appeal but pending automatic review by the SOJ.
The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authoritieswithin the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation. The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.
The Court answers in the negative.
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused’s constitutional right to liberty.
Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee’s right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor’s office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person’s basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30-day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 9165) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.
The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time when the present administration aggressively wages its “indisputably popular war on illegal drugs.” As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA, J.:
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Martires, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., no part.
G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017, IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH PETITION FOR RELIEF
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES PANGASINAN LEGAL AID AND JAY-AR R. SENIN, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, RESPONDENTS.
Citations omitted.