Reckless imprudence, defined. – “Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code defines reckless imprudence as voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his/her employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”,
Elements of the crime of reckless imprudence. – “The elements of the crime of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to doo an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation; degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”[1]
Simple and reckless imprudence are different species of crime. – In Ivler vs. Hon. Judge Modesto-San Pedro (Ivler), we emphasized that simple and reckless imprudence are distinct species of crimes, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws. Reckless imprudence is not merely a way of committing a crime. We noted that: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, while in intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; (2) the legislature intended to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses otherwise they would have been subsumed under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent; and (3) the penalty structure for quasi-crimes differ from intentional crimes in that the criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. Thus, the correct way of alleging quasi-crimes is to state that their commission resulted in damage, either to person or property, such as reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or simple imprudence causing damage to property.
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Ivler laid down the rule that Article 48 of the RPC does not apply to quasi-crimes, and prohibited splitting of actions in cases involving reckless imprudence.- :We recognized in Ivler that there are two approaches in the prosecution of quasi-crimes. The first approach applies Article 48 of the RPC while the second approach forbids its application. Article 48 deals with complex crimes. It allows the single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of the two categories, namely: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and (2) when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other. Light felonies are excluded in Article 48 and must be charged separately from resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies. In complex crimes, the accused will serve only the maximum penalty for the most serious crime. It is a procedural tool for the benefit of the accused. In contrast, the second approach sanctions a single prosecution for all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number and severity. After exhaustively discussing numerous case law, We declared that Article 48 of the RPC is not applicable to quasi-crimes. We forbade the “complexing” of. Single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except light felonies) to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional crimes. This way, the splitting of charges under Article 365 which results to rampant occasions of impermissible second prosecution based on the same act/s or omission/s are avoided. We explained Our ruling in this wise.
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under out penal code. Aricle 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrepctive of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecution are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.”[2]
Pp v. Morales declared that Ivler is now the law when it declared that Article 48 does not aooly to quasi-offenses– “We rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the “complexing” of the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 to quasi-offenses and their resultant acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under the RPC. We thus declare that Delos Santos is abandoned. We agree with Our pronouncements in Ivler. Article 48 does not apply to quasi-offenses under Article 365 because reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a mere way of committing a crime. Simple or reckless negligence does not exactly fally under the term “felonies” or acts of omissions committed by fault or culpa”[3]
[1] Valencia v. People, G.R. No. 235573, November 9, 2020, cited in Morales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240337, January 4, 2022
[2] Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 649 Phil. 478 (2010), cited in Morales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240337, January 4, 2022
[3] Morales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240337, January 4, 2022