Check defined. – “By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank ‘payable on demand. It is a negotiable instrument – written and signed by a drawer containing an unconditional order to pay on demand a sum certain in money. It is an undertaking that the drawer will pay the amount indicated thereon. “[1]
How discharged. – “X X X. Section 119 of the NIL, however, states that negotiable instrument line a check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money, to wit:
Sec. 119. Instrument; how discharged. – A negotiable instrument is discharged:
- By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor;
- By payment in due course by the part accommodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for his accommodation;
- By the intentional cancellation thereof by the holder;
- By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money;
- When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. (Emphasis supplied)[2]
Prescription of action based on check.- “A check therefore is subject to prescription of actions upon a written contract. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues;
- Upon a written contract;
- Upon an obligation created by law;
- Upon a judgment. (Emphasis supplied
Barring any extrajudicial or judicial demand that may toll the 10-year prescription period and any evidence which may indicate any other time when the obligation to pay is due, the cause of action based on a check is reckoned from the date indicated on the check.
If the check is undated, however, as in the present petition, the cause of action is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the check. This is so because regardless of the omission of the date indicated on the check, Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law instructs that an undated check is presumed dated as of the time of its issuance.”[3]
Elements of B.P. 22. – “To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”[4]
Rationale for requiring a written notice of dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. – “To establish the existence of the second element, the State should present the giving of a written notice of dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer of the dishonored check. The rationale for this requirement is rendered in Dico v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
To hold a person liable under B.P. 22, the prosecution must not only establish that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, it must further be shown that the accused knew at the time of the issuance of the check that he did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment.
This knowledge of insufficiency f funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check is the second element of the offense. Inasmuch as this element involved a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of said knowledge. Said section reads:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of such check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following” (a) the check is presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (b) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee; and ( c ) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution. X x x
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender due process.
The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution of she pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not giving the proper notice of dishonor. X x x (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)[5]
Payment deemed effected and obligation discharged for failure to encash the checks for more than ten years. – “However, payment is deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment os treated discharged, if a period of 10 years or more has elapsed from the date indicated on the check until the date of encashment otr presentment for payment. The failure to encash the checks within a reasonable time after issue, or more than 10 years in this instance, not only results in the checks becoming stale but also in the obligation to pay being deemed fulfilled by operation of law.”[6]
Demand letter must be served upon the accused prior to the filing of the criminal action. – “Admissions made by the accused in the pleadings submitted in the same case do not require further proof, especially so when such admission is categorical and definite. However, it will be noted that the accused executed the counter affidavit at a time when the private complainant has already filed the complaint for violation of BP 22 against her. It is unclear whether the accused came to know of the demand letter before the filing of the complaint against her. By all indications, she may have known about the demand letter when she received the copy of the complaint-affidavit and its annexes from the private complainant. In order to hold liable the accused for violation of BP 22, it is necessary that the notice of dishonor or demand letter must be served upon the accused before the filing of the complaint. Precisely, the purpose of the notice of dishonor is to give opportunity to the accused to pay the amount of the bouncing checks to avert criminal prosecution. If such admission was made after the filing of the complaint, any admission made by the accused in the pleadings without any referral as to the time when she received the demand letter would not prejudice her. To be admissible against the accused, the admission must be categorical and definite. Likewise, reminders or oral demand are not sufficient to bind the accused. The dishonor oor demand must be in writing as required under Sec. 3 of B.P. 22.”[7]
Liability of corporate officers in B.P. 22. – “When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name, he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.”[8]
Payment of docket fees. – Where petitioner had all the opportunity to raise the issue of the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction for nonpayment of docket fees, and yet failed to do the same, she is barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC for failure to pay the docket fees. “Petitioner cannot, on one hand, reap the benefits of the MTCC’s jurisdiction by having the criminal aspect of her case dismissed through the MTCC’s grant of her demurrer to evidence, and on the other hand, impugn the same jurisdiction after 11 years from the filing of the Informations for private respondent’s non-payment of docket fees. By upholding the MTCC’s jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of the case – because the MTCC granted her demurrer to evidence – and, later on, assailing the same court’s jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the case, this Court cannot help but observe how petitioner has been selective about the MTCC’s jurisdiction. This Court will not tolerate such an oscillating treatment of the MTCC’s jurisdiction. To allow the same will make a mockery of judicial processes.”[9]
[1] Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc. G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017
[2] Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc. G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017
[3] Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc. G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017
[4] Navarra v. People, 786 Phil. 439, 448 (2016), cited in Saul v. People and Alberto, G.R. No. 242900, June 08, 2020
[5] Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019, citing Resterio v. People, 695 Phil. 693 (2012) Dico v. Court of Appeals,
[6] Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc. G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017
[7] Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019
[8] Gosiaco v. Ching, 603 Phil. 457, 464-465 (2009), cited in Saul v. People and Alberto, G.R. No. 242900, June 08, 2020
[9] Apacible v. People of the Philippines and San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No. 233181, August 22, 2022.