With the enactment of B.P. 22, the two provisions of the law are often mistook as similar cases, but most often, a case for BP 22 is almost always accompanied by a separate case for Estafa under par. 2(d) of Article 315. While both penalize the issuance of worthless checks, there are stark differences between the two. While deceit and damage are essential elements in estafa, they are not required in B.P. Blg. 22. As already aforestated, under B.P. Blg. 22, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and is hence punishable.[1] Other differences between the two include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita”[2]
“A scrutiny of the two laws involved shows that the two offenses punished therein are different and distinct from each other. In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing bad check/s under the Revised Penal Code, deceit and damage are two essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant convictions with the further requisite that deceit in causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud. For violation of the Bouncing Checks Law under B.P. 22, on the other hand, these elements are not necessary, the essential element being knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds. The gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment and not the non-payment of an obligation.
Distinction between the two offenses is further found in their nature. Whereas the offense under article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is a malum in se requiring proof of criminal intent on the part of the offender as an essential ingredient focusing mainly on the damage caused to the property rights of the victim, the crime under B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum wherein criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed and considered a violation thereof as one committed against public interest.”[3]
Estafa and BP are separate, distinct and independent of each other, even though rooted in identical set of facts. – Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case nay be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects- subject to prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.”[4]
Thus, the argument that the filing of a BP 22 case after the institution of another case for Estafa through issuance of bouncing checks, on the same set of checks subject matter of the cases, constitute double jeopardy, must necessarily fail. “While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.”[5]
What sets Estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(d) from BP 22 is that good faith is a defense in the former, while the same is unavailing in the latter law.
On the other hand, both infractions require a notice of dishonor. “Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist. So holds the 2004 case of People v. Ojeda.
x x x [N]otice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the R[evised] P[enal] C[ode] and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notice of dishonor being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder.”[6]
Prima facie evidence of deceit in estafa under Article 315 par 2(d). – “Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that the failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that the said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretenses or fraudulent act.”[7]
Good faith as a defense in Estafa. – “Good faith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor. In this case, the debtor not only made arrangements for payment; as complainant herself categorically stated, the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount of the dishonored checks.”[8]
[1] Ricaforte v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154438, Septmber 5, 2007
[2] Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy, 260 Phil. 6 (1990) cited in Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba and People, G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014
[3] Ada v. Virola, G.R. Nos. 82346-47, April 17, 1989
[4] Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba and People, G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014, citing Lim v Kou Ping, G.R. No. 175256, August 23, 2012
[5] Pp v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 101127-31, November 18, 1993, cited in Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba and People, G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014
[6] Ong v. People, G.R. No. 165275, September 23, 2008, citing, People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004
[7] People v. Flores, G.R. No. 146921-22, January 31, 2002
[8] People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004