John issued four checks as security for a loan amounting to P6Million from Cristina. When the checks were presented for payment, they were dishonored, hence Cristina personally delivered a demand letter to John’s office which was received by his secretary. Cases for violation of BP 22 were thus filed against John, which were raffled off to the Sala of Judge Elvira De Castro. Because Judge De Castro was promoted to the RTC, trial ensued, conducted by pairing judge Marianito Santos. Later, Judge Labastida was appointed to Branch 58 of the MTC, and he took over the proceedings. When the case was submitted for promulgation, it was Judge Santos, the pairing judge, who wrote and promulgated the decision, as Judge Labastida died, and a new judge, Judge Mary George Cajandab-Caldona, took over as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 58. John was convicted for violation of BP 22.
Instead of filing an appeal before the RTC, John filed a petition for certiorari with the said court. In an Order, dated 15 June 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of petitioner. It held that the expanded authority of pairing courts under Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, dated 18 February 1998, clearly gave Judge Santos authority to resolve the criminal cases which were submitted for decision when he was still the pairing judge. The RTC added that Judge Santos was in a better position to render judgment on the case, as he was the one who heard the testimony of the witness, and Judge Cajandab-Caldona was recently appointed to the court.
On question of law, John elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. He argues that it should have been Judge Cajandab-Caldona who promulgated the case, as she is the duly appointed presiding judge of Branch 58, while Judge Santos was just a pairing judge. He also argues that there was no notice of dishonour served upon him, thus he should not be convicted for BP 22, as the demand letter was served only on his secretary.
The Issue:
Whether or not a pairing judge may decide a case when there is a duly-designated presiding judge in the court, as in this case.
Whether or not there was a valid service of notice of dishonor.
The Ruling:
Appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to question the MeTC decision.
At the outset, petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought to assail the MeTC decision. First, it has been consistently held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action of certiorari will not be entertained – remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal.
Second, even if a petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The filing of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of reexamination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.
Third, petitioner was not able to establish his allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,the Court explained:
The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.” From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross x x x.
As will be discussed, there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law on the part of Judge Santos. He was clothed with authority to decide the criminal cases filed against petitioner.
In addition, considering that petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari which is an original action, the proper remedy after denial thereof is to appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of notice of appeal.Hence, when petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court, not only did he disregard the time-honored principle of hierarchy of courts, he also availed of the wrong remedy for the second time.
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapses committed by petitioner, in the interest of prompt dispensation of justice and to prevent further prolonging the proceedings in this case, the Court resolves to give due course to his petition and rule on the merits thereof.
Judge Santos had authority to render the assailed decision even after the assumption to office of the designated presiding judge of Branch 58.
Petitioner cites Circular No. 19-98 to support his contention that Judge Santos no longer had the authority to render the assailed decision at the time of its promulgation on 15 April 2009. The circular reads:
In the interest of efficient administration of justice, the authority of the pairing judge under Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 (Pairing System for Multiple Sala Stations) to act on incidental or interlocutory matters and those urgent matters requiring immediate action on cases pertaining to the paired court shall henceforth be expanded to include all other matters. Thus, whenever a vacancy occurs by reason of resignation, dismissal, suspension, retirement, death, or prolonged absence of the presiding judge in a multi-sala station, the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all the cases thereat as acting judge therein until the appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge or the return of the regular incumbent judge, or until further orders from this Court. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the OSG avers that Judge Santos was in due exercise of his authority as provided by Circular No. 5-98, viz:
- Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an Acting/Assisting Judge shall cease to continue hearing cases in the court where he is detailed and shall return to his official station upon the assumption of the appointed Presiding Judge or the newly designated Acting Presiding Judge thereat. Cases left by the former shall be tried and decided by the appointed Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge.
- However, cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage, i.e. where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such Acting/Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former. This authority shall include resolutions of motions for reconsideration and motions for new trial thereafter filed. But if a new trial is granted, the Presiding Judge thereafter appointed or designated shall preside over the new trial until it is terminated and shall decide the same.
- If the Acting/Assisting Judge is appointed to another branch but in the same station, cases heard by him shall be transferred to the branch where he is appointed and he shall continue to try them. He shall be credited for these cases by exempting him from receiving an equal number during the raffle of newly filed cases. x x x (emphasis supplied)
Both circulars are applicable in the case at bar in that Circular No. 5-98 complements Circular No. 19-98. Undoubtedly, the judge of the paired court serves as acting judge only until the appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge. Clearly, the acting judge may no longer promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position. Circular No. 5-98, however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge, shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter’s assumption or designation.
In this case, Judge Santos, as judge of the paired court, presided over the trial of the cases which commenced with the presentation of the prosecution’s first witness on 7 June 2006. On 25 July 2007, Judge Labastida was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch 58 and he took over the trial of the cases.The promulgation of judgment was tentatively set on 30 September 2008. Unfortunately, sometime in December 2008, Judge Labastida died.Hence, it was incumbent upon Judge Santos to serve as acting judge of Branch 58 as a result of Judge Labastida’s untimely death. When Judge Caldona assumed the position of Acting Presiding Judge on 1 April 2009,the cases already passed the trial stage as they were in fact submitted for decision. Further, it is worthy to note that Judge Santos presided over a significant portion of the proceedings as compared to Judge Caldona who assumed office long after the cases were submitted for decision. Finally, the use of the word “shall” in Circular No. 5-98 makes it mandatory for Judge Santos to decide the criminal cases against petitioner. Clearly, Judge Santos had the authority to render the assailed decision on 15 April 2009 notwithstanding Judge Caldona’s assumption to office.
Failure to prove petitioner’s receipt of notice of dishonor warrants his acquittal.
To be liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment
Here, the existence of the second element is in dispute. In Yu Oh v. CA,the Court explained that since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.
x x x x
Indeed, this requirement [on proof of receipt of notice of dishonor] cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.(emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
The Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Yao testified that the personal secretary of petitioner received the demand letter,yet, said personal secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact handed the demand letter to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be borne in mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused.
In this case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end since there is no showing when petitioner actually received the demand letter. The MeTC, in its decision, merely said that such requirement was fully complied with without any sufficient discussion. Indeed, it is not impossible that petitioner’s secretary had truly handed him the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
Nonetheless, petitioner’s acquittal for failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt does not extinguish his civil liability for the dishonored checks. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 15 June 2010 and 28 December 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in SCA No. 3338 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner John Dennis G. Chua is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on four (4) counts on the ground that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Cristina Yao the face value of the subject checks in the aggregate amount of P6,082,000.00, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until 30 June 2013, and 6% per annum from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIRES, J.:
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017, JOHN DENNIS G. CHUA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CRISTINA YAO, RESPONDENTS.
Citations omitted.
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