Romulo was the presiding judge of a criminal case where three accused for violation of RA 9165 were charged. He presided over their arraignment and ordered the consolidation of the trial. For health reasons, Romulo resigned his judgeship and engaged in private practice; his services were later on engaged by the same clients in the criminal case where he formerly presided as judge. The RTC convicted the accused, but on appeal, the CA acquitted them. The CA noted, however, that Romulo should not have handled the case of the accused, as he was the one who presided over their arraignment and acted in the initial stages of the case. Thus, the CA referred the case to the IBP for administrative investigation.
In his defense, Romulo averred there is no prohibition against a former judge to accept as his client somebody who was an accused in his sala when he was still judge. His participation in the case was limited only to the initial stages of the criminal case.
The IBP in its Report and Recommendation noted that Romulo should be held liable for violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
During the pendency of the case, Romulo died.
The Issue:
Whether or not Romulo should be held administratively liable.
The Ruling:
Rule 6.03 of the CPR states:
Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
In Olazo v. Tinga, the Court held that Rule 6.03 contemplates of a situation where a lawyer, formerly in the government service, accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
The rationale for the prohibition under Rule 6.03 is this: private lawyers who, during their tenure in government service, had possessed the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings, are bound to enjoy an undue advantage over other private lawyers because of their substantial access to confidential information on the matter (including the submissions of a counter-party), as well as to the government’s resources dedicated to process/resolve the same (including contacts in the institution where the matter is pending). Thus, to obviate the temptation of these government lawyers to exploit the information, contacts, and influence garnered while in the service when they leave for private practice, the prohibition under Rule 6.03 was formulated.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan (PCGG),[25] the Court took pains to trace the roots of Rule 6.03 and discussed the so-called “revolving door” concern, which was the original impetus behind the prohibition under Rule 6.03:
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the “revolving door” or “the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.” These concerns were classified as “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.” “Adverse-interest conflicts” exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand, “congruent-interest representation conflicts” are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers, x x x To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interest representation conflicts.” The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. Canon 36 provides, viz.:
26. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
According to the PCGG case, Rule 6.03 of CPR retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics “but replaced the expansive phrase “investigated and passed upon ” with the word “intervened.”Notably, the word “intervened” was held to only include “an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.” The intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. It does not “includ[e] participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.”
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent not only presided over the arraignment proceedings involving the accused but also ordered the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 3265, 3266, and 3267 upon his determination that the cases involved a commonality of evidence. Accordingly, he performed acts that influenced the outcome of the proceedings. To be sure, the arraignment is an essential stage of criminal prosecution where discretionary matters (such as plea bargaining or a motion to suspend arraignment) may be raised, and without which the criminal cases cannot proceed. Furthermore, by conducting the arraignment of the accused, respondent had necessarily examined the records forwarded by the prosecutor and consequently, determined the existence of probable cause; otherwise, the case would have already been dismissed.
Meanwhile, in ordering the joint trial, respondent had to examine the records of these cases in order to determine the commonality of evidence. Case law states that joint trial is permissible where the actions arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.Given respondent’s directive for joint trial, the presentation of evidence must now cover ail the charges against and the defenses for all the accused, unlike before when they were to be taken individually.
Thus, given the significance of these acts to the outcome of the proceedings, respondent’s acts fall within the ambit of the prohibition under Rule 6.03. Hence, he should not have accepted the engagement to be the private counsel of the accused in the same criminal cases in which he had previously intervened while in the government service.
However, due to respondent’s supervening death, the Court finds it apt to dismiss the instant administrative complaint. The general rule is that “the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent’s case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case.” In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,it was explained that:
This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications… If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
The above rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero,the Court ruled that the death of the respondent necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: first, the observance of respondent’s right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons’, and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed.
Here, the Court would have merely reprimanded respondent for his ethical violation. However, since this penalty cannot anymore be implemented because respondent had already passed away, and further taking into account equitable and humanitarian considerations, the Court finds it proper to dismiss the administrative complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent former Judge Romulo P. Atencia is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Citations omitted.
A. C. No. 8911, July 8, 2019, IN RE: ATTY. ROMULO P. ATENCIA: REFERRAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF A LAWYER’S UNETHICAL CONDUCT AS INDICATED IN ITS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 2011 IN CA-G.R. CR-HC NO. 03322 (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. AURORA TATAC, ET AL.).
SEE ALSO:
Authentication Of Electronic Evidence