Samuel is one of the heirs of Esmeraldo Gatchalian, who, together with his wife, Liceria, were the registered owners of a parcel of land (Road Lot 23) in Bgy. Vitalez, Paranaque. According to the petitioner, a portion of the lot owned by Segundo Mendoza encroached on Road Lot 23; through the years, Segundo’s lot was sold and subdivided, until such time that the respondents stayed on the encroached portion, which the heirs tolerated. When the respondents showed signs of ingratitude, he filed a complaint for ejectment. In their defense, the respondents did not question Samuel’s co-ownership of the lot; instead, they averred that the lot is now public property now known as “Don Juan Street Gat-Mendoza“. In the subdivision plan of the GAT Mendoza Housing area, Road Lot 23 is constituted as a right of way. It should be the City Government of Paranaque City which should file the case, they aver.
The MeTC ruled in Samuel’s favor. The RTC, however, reversed the MeTC ruling. The Court of Appeals initially ruled in favor of Samuel, but reconsider its ruling and ruled in favor of the respondents. It ruled that the private character of Road Lot 23 has been stripped by Municipal Ordinance No. 88-04, series of 1988 constituting the said road lot as a public right-of way. Laches has set in, according to the CA.
The Issue:
Whether or not Road Lot 23 is now public property.
The petition is granted.
At the outset, petitioner filed before the MeTC an action for ejectment against the respondents. It is settled that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for the Court’s resolution is, who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject property. Issues as to ownership are not involved, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
In the instant case, petitioner asserts that he is entitled to the possession of the road lot being one of the co-owners of the same since it is registered under the name of petitioner’s parents. While respondents do not claim ownership of the subject lot, they argued that the road lot is now public property because of Ordinance No. 88-04, series of 1988 constituting it as “Don Juan St. Gat-Mendoza”. As such, petitioner cannot evict respondents.
It is undisputed that the road lot is registered under the name of petitioner’s parents. Even the respondents did not dispute this fact. It is also undisputed that the municipal government has not undertaken any expropriation proceedings to acquire the subject property neither did the petitioner donate or sell the same to the municipal government. Therefore, absent any expropriation proceedings and without any evidence that the petitioner donated or sold the subject property to the municipal government, the same is still private property.
In the case of Woodridge School, Inc. v. ARB Construction Co., Inc., this Court held that:
In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that “the road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.” Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character. The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public’s passage through it. To repeat, “the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase or expropriation, if they are to be utilized as a public road.”
As reiterated in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. Sps. Llamas, this Court held that:
As there is no such thing as an automatic cessation to [the] government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the subdivision owner: “subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation.”
Since the local government of Parañaque has not purchased nor undertaken any expropriation proceedings, neither did the petitioner and his siblings donate the subject property, the latter is still a private property and Ordinance No. 88-04 did not convert the same to public property.
As to the CA’s finding that by virtue of laches the subject property has been converted into public property, We do not agree.
It is well-settled that an “owner of [a] registered land does not lose his rights over a property on the ground of laches as long as the opposing claimant’s possession was merely tolerated by the owner.”
A torrens title is irrevocable and its validity can only be challenged in a direct proceeding.A torrens title is an indefeasible and impresciptible title to a property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The owner is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. The person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. As such, petitioner can file an ejectment case against herein respondents who encroached upon a portion of petitioner’s property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated October 23, 2015 and Resolution dated June 15, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 126530 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated December 9, 2011 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2011-49 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
TIJAM, J.:
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 225176, January 19, 2018, ESMERALDO GATCHALIAN, DULY REPRESENTED BY SAMUEL GATCHALIAN, PETITIONER, V. CESAR FLORES, JOSE LUIS ARANETA, CORAZON QUING, AND CYNTHIA FLORES, RESPONDENTS.
Citations omitted.