An Information for Other Forms of Swindling was filed against the spouses Guimoc before the Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan. The petitioner, upon being informed that she needs to pay the docket fee of P500,00 paid the same. After trial, only Elenita was found guilty of the crime charged, but the spouses were found civilly liable; Elenita for the amount of P507,000.00 and Teodorico for P60,000.00, with legal interest from December 13, 2006. The spouses appealed to the RTC, and in their Memorandum of Appal argued that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages as Isabel failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35-2004(SC Circular No. 35-2004), which provides that the filing fees must be paid for money claims in estafa cases. They claimed that due to petitioner’s failure to make an express reservation to separately institute a civil action, her payment of filing fees in the amount of P500.00 was deficient. The damages sought was worth P663,000.00;thus, the correct filing fees should have allegedlybeen around P9,960.00.
The RTC denied the appeal, affirming the criminal liability of Elenita, but did not rule on the civil liabilities of the spouses. The CA, on petition for review by the spouses, in an Amended Decision, granted respondents’ motion for reconsideration and set aside its earlier decision affirming the RTC ruling. It held that SC Circular No. 35-2004 was in effect at the time Isabel filed the case against the spouses, and therefore, the court a quo erred when it awarded damages in her favor. Consequently, the CA deleted the order directing respondents to pay their respective civil liabilities.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in deleting the award of civil liability for failure to pay the correct docket fee by the petitioner.
The Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.”
Among these exceptions, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC- which guidelines were reflected in SC Circular No. 35-2004 and was already in effect at the time the Information was filed – states that the payment of filing fees is required in estafa cases under the following conditions:
SEC. 21. Other fees. -The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of court of the regional trial courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
(a) In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen (15) days following the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or would be separately prosecuted, or in violations of BP No. 22 if the amount involved is:
x x x x
In the 1987 case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA (Manchester) the Court laid down the general rule that “[a court] acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.”In Manchester, the Court upheld the CA’s dismissal of the case filed therein, based on the following circumstances:
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damage be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners’ counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Around two (2) years later, the Court, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd v. Asuncion (Sun Insurance), clarified that the ruling in Manchester was made “due to the fraud committed on the government”; thus, it was explained that the court a quo in Manchester “did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.” In Sun Insurance, however, the Court found that “a more liberal interpretation of the rules [was] called for considering that, unlike Manchester, [the] private respondent [therein] demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.” Nonetheless, the Court held that “the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, x x x must require the private respondent to pay the same.”
Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that “when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.”
In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that “[t]he non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.” “The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith.”
Thus, in the cases of Rivera v. del Rosario, Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Navarro,[ United Overseas Bank v. Ros (United Overseas Bank), and The Heirs of Reinoso, Sr. v. CA, the Court has consistently ruled that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the courts a quo therein upon the full payment of the docket fees as assessed by the clerk of court. In these cases, the Court held that the liberal doctrine in the matter of paying docket fees enunciated in Sun Insurance, and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply in cases where insufficient filing fees were paid based on the assessment made by the clerk of court, provided that there was no intention to defraud the government. In so ruling, the Court explained that when there is underpayment of docket fees, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action would be required to pay the deficiency which shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by petitioner was insufficient to cover the required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that she paid the full amount of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which is evidenced by a certification dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In addition, petitioner consistently manifested her willingness to pay additional docket fees when required. In her petition, she claims that she is “very much willing to pay the correct docket fees which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court[,] and records show that she paid the [MTC] of the amount assessed from her.” Indeed, the foregoing actuations negate any bad faith on petitioner’s part, much more belie any intent to defraud the government. As such, applying the principles above-discussed, the Court holds that the court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as a lien on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 2. Fees in lien. — Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
. Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the assessment of filing fees was incorrect, then it was incumbent upon them to have raised the same before the MTC. Instead, contrary to the CA’s assertion, records show that respondents actively participated in the proceedings before the MTC and belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of docket fees only for the first time on appealbefore the RTC, or five (5) years later after the institution of the instant case. The Court is aware that lack of jurisdiction, as a ground to dismiss a complaint, may, as a general rule, be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, in United Overseas Bank, the Court has observed that the same is subject to the doctrine of estoppel by laches, which squarely applies here. In United Overseas Bank:
In its Order, the lower court even recognized the validity of petitioner’s claim of lack of jurisdiction had it timely raised the issue. It bears to stress that the non-payment of the docket fees by private respondent and the supposed lack of jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over Civil Case No.98-90089 was raised by the petitioner only five years after institution of the instant case and after one of the private respondent’s witnesses was directly examined in open court. Not only that, the petitioner even implored the court a quo‘s jurisdiction by filing an Answer with Counterclaim praying that the amount of P12,643,478.46 as deficiency claim of the credit granted to private respondent and the sum , P6,411,786.19 as full payment of one of the Letters of Credit, be awarded , in its favor. Petitioner likewise prayed for the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit.
x x x x
x x x It is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a Motion to Dismiss at the earliest opportune time to raise the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction, more so, that this issue is susceptible to laches. Petitioner’s failure to seasonably raise the question of jurisdiction leads us to the inevitable conclusion that it is now barred by laches to assail the Manila RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. As defined in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy [131 Phil. 556, 563 (1968)]:
Laches, in general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. By way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question of whether or not the court had jurisdiction either over the subject matter of the action or the parties is not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct, not because the judgment or the order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated by reason of public policy.
x x x x
Since the Manila RTC ruled that the petitioner is now estopped by laches from questioning its jurisdiction and considering that its Order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion but wholly substantiated by the evidence on the record, this Court would no longer disturb said order.
Accordingly, the Court sets aside the assailed CA rulings. A new one is entered ordering Elenita and Teodorico to pay petitioner the amounts of P507,000.00 and P60,000.00, respectively, both with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, reckoned not from December 13, 2006 as ruled by the MTC, but from the time the Information was filed on June 30, 2006, consistent with existing jurisprudence on estafa cases, and six percent (6%) per annum, from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction. Further, the MTC is directed to determine the amount of deficient docket fees, which shall constitute a lien on the aforementioned monetary awards.
As a final note, it must be pointed out that this Decision only relates to respondents’ civil liabilities as records are bereft of any showing that further recourse was taken against the rulings of the courts a quo on the criminal aspect of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated March 21, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131201 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED, ordering:
| (1) | Respondents Elenita Guimoc and Teodorico Guimoc, Jr. to pay petitioner Isabel G. Ramones the amounts of P507,000.00 and P60,000.00, respectively, both with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, from June 30, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum, from July 1, 2013 until full payment; and |
| (2) | The Municipal Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan to determine the deficient docket fees in Criminal Case No. 06-8539, which shall constitute a lien on the aforementioned monetary awards. |
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Carpio (Chairperson),[*] Jardeleza,[**] and Tijam,[***] JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on wellness leave.
G.R. No. 226645, August 13, 2018, ISABEL G. RAMONES, PETITIONER, V. SPOUSES TEODORICO GUIMOC, JR. AND ELENITA GUIMOC, RESPONDENTS.
Citations omitted.