Gloria was the winning bidder in a public auction conducted by the City of Makati of a lot covered by TCT No. 164900, owned by the De Guzman family. Because the lot was not redeemed during the one-year redemption period, Gloria filed an application for a new title in LRC Case No. M-4992. After hearing the RTC cancelled TCT No. 164900 and a new title, TCT No. T-224923 was issued in Gloria’s case. In the same proceeding, Gloria filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the RTC denied for failure to set the motion for hearing.
Gloria thus filed a petition for issuance of writ of possession in LRC Case No. M-5188 before the RTC of Makati City, raffled to Branch 59. The trial court granted the petition and issued a writ of possession. The De Guzman family, however, filed a petition to cite Gloria in contempt for having a defective verification and certification on forum-shopping. They also allege that Gloria committed forum shopping.
The RTC, however denied the motion. It ruled that Gloria’s petition for issuance of writ of possession, while denominated as a petition, is not an initiatory pleading, and thus does not require a certificate of no-forum shopping. Their motion for reconsideration denied, the De Guzman family elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari. Aside from their contention that forum shopping exists in the case, they also argue that the tax auction sale proceeding is governed by Sections 246 to 270 of the Local Government Code, and not by Act No. 3135.
The Issue:
Whether or not a certificate of forum shopping is required for a petition for issuance of a writ of position.
The Ruling:
We deny the petition.
No certificate against forum shopping
is required in a petition or motion for
issuance of a writ of possession.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that a certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The non-initiatory nature of an ex parte motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is best explained in Arquiza v. Court of Appeals. In that case we ruled that the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation, but rather issues as an incident or consequence of the original registration or cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping certification is dispelled.
We also cannot subscribe to petitioners’ narrow view that only cases covered by foreclosure sales under Act No. 3135 are excused from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping.
Based on jurisprudence, a writ of possession may be issued in the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as The Land Registration Act; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales.
We note that there is no law or jurisprudence which provides that the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession depends on the nature of the proceeding in which it is filed. Thus, we find no logical reason for petitioners’ contention that only cases covered by Act No. 3135 are exempt from the requirement of a certificate against forum shopping. As explained in the previous paragraphs, by its very nature, a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title. It is an incident of ownership, and not a separate judgment. It would thus be absurd to require that a petition for the issuance of this writ to be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.
The issuance of a writ of possession is
warranted.
Petitioners cite the rulings in Factor v. Martel, Jr., Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, and Maglente v. Baltazar-Padilla to justify their position that respondent availed of the wrong remedy when she filed an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners contend that this is a departure from the proper procedure which required the filing of an appropriate case for accion reivindicatoria.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the cases petitioner cited do not involve actions pertaining to tax delinquency sales. Respondent adds that petitioners could not, in fact, identify a particular provision of law or jurisprudence saying that a buyer in a tax delinquency sale has to file an independent action to be able to take possession of the property he brought in a tax delinquency sale.
We agree with respondent.
Factor involves the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to an original action for registration; Serra Serra involves a petition for reconstitution; while Maglente involves an action for interpleader. These rulings cannot apply in this case. For one, none of them contemplate the present situation where the action is between, on the one hand, the previous registered owner of the parcel of land; and on the other, the buyer in a tax delinquency sale. Second, none of these cases involves the right of a purchaser in a tax delinquency sale for the issuance of a writ of possession after the redemption period.
Contrary therefore, to petitioners’ contentions, the CA did not err in upholding the writ of possession in this case. In St. Raphael Montessori School, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, an action involving the application of Act No. 3135, this Court recognized that the writ of possession was warranted not merely on the basis of the law, but ultimately on the right to possess as an incident of ownership. The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership, and it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession. Precisely, the basis for the grant of the writ of possession in this case is respondent’s ownership of the property by virtue of a tax delinquency sale in her favor, and by virtue of her absolute right of ownership arising from the expiration of the period within which to redeem the property.
In Cloma v. Court of Appeals, the City of Pasay sold the property of Spouses Cloma at public auction for tax delinquency. Private respondent Nocom was declared the winning bidder of the sale, for which he was issued a certificate of sale. The spouses failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period, and a final deed of sale was issued in favor of Nocom. Thus, Nocom filed a petition invoking Section 75 of PD No. 1529 (as in this case), which was granted. Accordingly, Nocom applied for a writ of possession over the property, and was eventually granted by the trial court. The spouses argued that the trial court cannot issue the writ of possession. This Court rejected this argument, citing Section 2 of PD No. 1529. This Court said:
Section 2 of PD 1529 also clearly rejects the thesis of petitioners that the trial court cannot issue a writ of possession to effectuate the result of a tax sale, thus:
“Sec 2. Nature of registration of proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. — x x x Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title, to land, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. x x x” (Emphasis in the original.)
More, respondent’s ownership over the property is affirmed by the final and executory judgment in LRC Case No. M-4992. To be clear, a writ of possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.
In the same vein, we note the finding of the court a quo in granting the ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession of respondent, thus:
Facts of the case reveal that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, rendered a Decision under LRC Case No. M-4992 which granted Chico’s Petition for Application for a New Certificate of Title under Sec. 75 in relation to Sec. 107 of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decision became final and executory on 27 February 2008.
Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court succinctly provides that when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all ancilliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer, and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.
The reason for the premature issuance of the writ of possession in Republic (Department of Transportation and Communication [DOTC]) v. City of Mandaluyongdoes not obtain in this case. In Republic, the Metro Rail Transit Corporation failed to pay the real property taxes due to the City of Mandaluyong, hence a public auction was conducted. For lack of bidders, the real properties were forfeited in favor of the city. The period for the redemption of the real properties expired, thus a final deed of sale was issued in the city’s favor. By virtue of this final deed of sale, the city filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, which the regional trial court granted. The DOTC questioned the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession. While this Court held that a writ of possession is a mere incident in the transfer of title, and which may arise from ownership by virtue of a tax delinquency sale, we nonetheless ruled that the issuance of the writ was premature. The reason being, there was still a pending issue on whether the auction sale should proceed, in the first place.
This impediment does not exist in this case precisely because title has already been consolidated, and a new certificate of title has already been issued in the name of respondent in LRC Case No. M-4992. More, unlike in Republic, records of this case already established that the Decision in LRC Case No. M-4992 has long become final and executory, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment issued on March 3, 2008.Hence, the issuance of a writ of possession is warranted. As the trial court ruled, “[a]ll things considered, the petitioner is now the lawful registered owner of the subject property and by virtue of law, is entitled to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in her name.”
Finally, petitioners cannot attack the validity of the proceedings in LRC Case No. M-4992. Having become final and executory, the judgment in LRC Case No. M-4992 can only be nullified in a petition for annulment of judgment, which petitioner did not do. The general rule is that a final and executory judgment can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, and that nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executory decision may, however, be invalidated via a petition for relief or a petition to annul the same under Rules 38 or 47, respectively, of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114103 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JARDELEZA, J.:
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 195445, December 7, 2016, ANGELINA DE GUZMAN, GILBERT DE GUZMAN, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, JR., AND ANTHONY DE GUZMAN, PETITIONERS, V. GLORIA A. CHICO, RESPONDENT.
Citations omitted.