Adtel, Inc. was the respondent in an illegal dismissal case filed by its former employee, Marijoy, a former accountant and later purchasing and logistics supervisor. Her husband, Manuel, entered into a dealership agreement with Adtel for the distribution of Wideband VHF-UHF television antennas, but later filed a civil case for specific performance and damages against Adtel, and a criminal case for libel against its officers, its chairman, and president. Adtel thus required Marijoy to explain why she should not be terminated from employment for alleged conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence. Finding her explanation insufficient, Adtel terminated Marijoy’s employment, thus the illegal dismissal case.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Adtel, but the NLRC reversed the LA decision, thus Adtel decided to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Upon receipt of the NLRC decision denying its motion for reconsideration on February 9, 2009, Adtel filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari on April 7, 2009 for another 15 days. It filed its petition for certiorari on April 22, 2009. In its motion for extension of time, Adtel’s counsel cited heavy volume of work in not being able to file its petition for certiorari within the 60-day period allowed by law.
The CA however denied the motion for extension of time to file the petition for certiorari, and refused to give due course to the petition for certiorari filed by Adtel on the 75th day, holding that the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari can no longer be extended pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA properly denied the motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari.
The Ruling:
We deny the petition.
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. — The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the motion. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from the notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court stated the rationale for the strict observance of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, to wit:
The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60-day period was non-extendible and the CA no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension in view of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65.
However, in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan this Court held that the strict observance of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari is not absolute. This Court ruled that absent any express prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension is still permitted, subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Similarly, in Labao v. Flores, this Court recognized that the extension of the 60-day period may be granted by the Court in the presence of special or compelling circumstances provided that there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply with the rules. Likewise, in Mid-Islands Power Generation v. Court of Appeals this Court held that a motion for extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 subject to the Court’s sound discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious cases.
The exception to the 60-day rule to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was also applied by this Court in a more recent case in Republic of the Philippines v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., to wit: “[u]nder exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, [the] said period may be extended pursuant to [the] Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.”
Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reasons.
Adtel’s motion for extension filed with the CA on 7 April 2009 reads:
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari was due for filing yesterday, 06 April 2009 or sixty (60) days from 05 February 2009, the date of receipt of the Resolution dated 24 December 2008 issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Considering that yesterday was a holiday, the petition in effect is due today, 07 April 2009.
2. While a draft of the pleading had already been prepared, final revisions have yet to be completed. However, due to the undersigned counsel’s heavy volume of work, petitioner is constrained to request for an additional period of fifteen (15) days from today or up to 22 April 2009 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari.
3. This motion is not intended to delay the proceedings but is prompted solely by the above-stated reason.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays for an extension of fifteen (15) days from 07 April 2009 or up to 22 April 2009 within which to file its Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner prays for such other relief which may be deemed just and equitable under the circumstances. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the circumstance of heavy workload alone, absent a compelling or special reason, is not a sufficient justification to allow an extension of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari, to wit:
Heavy workload, which is relative and often self serving, ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of merit. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule. Thus, we are constrained to state that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for having been filed late.
In Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,this Court held that the heavy workload of counsel is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason for availing a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. Similarly, in Mid-Islands Power, this Court ruled that the heavy workload and the resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules under Rule 65. In both Thenamaris and Mid-Islands Power, this Court denied the motions for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari and held that the heavy workload of counsel was not a compelling reason contemplated by the Rules of Court.
As previously stated in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his or her failure to comply with Rule 65. Accordingly, in the absence of a more compelling reason cited in the motion for extension of time other than the “undersigned counsel’s heavy volume of work,” the CA did not commit a reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 28 May 2009 and 8 October 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108169.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.:
Peralta, Mendoza, Leonen, and Martires, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017, ADTEL, INC. AND/OR REYNALDO T. CASAS, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIJOY A. VALDEZ, RESPONDENT.
Citations omitted.