Manuel was charged as co-conspirator in a kidnapping for ransom case along with Rolando Villaber, the alleged group leader, Cesar Olimpiada, a certain Cholo, and Biboy Lugnasin, Rolando and Harold Fajardo, and the alleged driver of the group, Cancio Cubillas, for the abduction of Mary Grace Cheng, and two other victims. According to Cubillas, who turned state witness, it was Villaver, Olimpiada, Cholo and Lugnasin who negotiated with Mary Gaace’s father, Robert Cheng for the payment of ransom, and out of this ransom, P1.25 Million was given to him. Manuel was a co-conspirator in the kidnapping case, and received a part of the proceeds from the ransom money.
In 2008, Manuel was arrested, thus he filed a first Petition for Bail, which the RTC denied. The RTC relied on the testimony of Cubillas who implicated Manuel in the kidnapping case. He appealed this denial to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC decision denying his first petition for bail.
In the meantime, Manuel’s co-accused, Rolando Fajardo, was arrested. He too filed a petition for bail, which hearings also relied heavily on the testimony of Cubillas, the state witness. At first, the RTC denied Rolando’s petition for bail but in a motion for reconsideration, reversed itself, and granted bail to Rolando.
As Manuel was the only one left in detention, and all the others were already released from detention, Manuel saw Rolando’s release from jail due to the approval of his petition for bail as a new development which warranted a new petition for bail, thus, he filed a second petition for bail. He noted that Cubillas could not explain how either Rolando or Manuel advised Villaver and that both Rolando and Manuel were absent before, during, and after the kidnapping. Hence, if Rolando’s petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability of Cubillas’ testimony, Manuel reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him provisional release.
The RTC denied his second petition for bail, and his motion for reconsideration, citing the CA decision denying his first petition for bail.
The Court of Appeals, however, granted Manuel’s petition for certiorari, and granted bail to Manuel. It also denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, averring that: Escobar’s Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata, which applies only if the former judgment is a final order or judgment and not an interlocutory order. An order denying a petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.
The prosecution elevated the case to the Supreme Court. It argues that the RTC and CA’s denial of the first petition for bail filed by Manuel constitute res judicata thus his second petition for bail should be denied on that ground.
The Issue:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in criminal proceedings.
The Ruling
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether Manuel Escobar’s second petition for bail is barred by res judicata; and
Finally, whether respondent should be granted bail.
I
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has been arrested and detained but “whose guilt has not yet been proven” in court beyond reasonable doubt. The right to bail is cognate to the fundamental right to be presumed innocent. In People v. Fitzgerald:
The right to bail emanates from the [accused’s constitutional] right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he [or she] enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his [or her] appearance before any court, as required under specified conditions. (Citations omitted)
Bail may be a matter of right or judicial discretion. The accused has the right to bail if the offense charged is “not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment” before conviction by the Regional Trial Court.However, if the accused is charged with an offense the penalty of which is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment—”regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution”—and when evidence of one’s guilt is not strong, then the accused’s prayer for bail is subject to the discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the imposable penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, reduced to reclusion perpetua. Escobar’s bail is, thus, a matter of judicial discretion, provided that the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
….
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. – No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court denied Escobar’s Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. The Court of Appeals overturned this and correctly ruled that his Second Bail Petition was not barred by res judicata.
In its literal meaning, res judicata refers to “a matter adjudged.”This doctrine bars the re-litigation of the same claim between the parties, also known as claim preclusion or bar by former judgment. It likewise bars the re-litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties, also known as issue preclusion or conclusiveness of judgement.It “exists as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency, practical necessity, and public tranquillity.”
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasanheld that “[t]he doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39”of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
Sec. 47. Effect of Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
….
(b) [T]he judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Escobar’s Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata as this doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings.
Expressly applicable in civil cases, res judicata settles with finality the dispute between the parties or their successors-in-interest.Trinidad v. Marcelodeclares that res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is a principle in civil law and “has no bearing on criminal proceedings.” Rule 124, Section 18 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Indeed, while certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Trinidad:
Petitioner’s arguments — that res judicata applies since the Office of the Ombudsman twice found no sufficient basis to indict him in similar cases earlier filed against him, and that the Agan cases cannot be a supervening event or evidence per se to warrant a reinvestigation on the same set of facts and circumstances — do not lie.
Res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on criminal proceedings.
But even if petitioner’s arguments] were to be expanded to contemplate “res judicata in prison grey” or the criminal law concept of double jeopardy, this Court still finds it inapplicable to bar the reinvestigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
An interlocutory order denying an application for bail, in this case being criminal in nature, does not give rise to res judicata. As in Trinidad, even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to contemplate “res judicata in prison grey” or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. Double jeopardy requires that the accused has been convicted or acquitted or that the case against him or her has been dismissed or terminated without his express consent.Here, while there was an initial ruling on Escobar’s First Bail Petition, Escobar has not been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated.
Even assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases, Escobar’s Second Bail Petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment on the merits.
Res judicata requires the concurrence of the following elements:
- The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
- The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
- The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
- There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
In deciding on a matter before it, a court issues either a final judgment or an interlocutory order. A final judgment “leaves nothing else to be done” because the period to appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case.[117] In contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not yet a final judgment on the entire controversy.
An interlocutory order “settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action”; in other words, something else still needs to be done in the primary case—the rendition of the final judgment. Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.In Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit:
Citing Section 49 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, petitioner insists that the September 17, 1997 [interlocutory] Order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 3517 bars it from rehearing questions on the ownership of Lot 4417. She insists that said Order has become final and executory, because Dr. Magalit did not appeal it.
We disagree. Final, in the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The phrase refers to a. final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling under the second category.
….
For example, an Order overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata [sic] that will bar a subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A decision denying a petition for bail settles only a collateral matter—whether accused is entitled to provisional liberty—and is not a final judgment on accused’s guilt or innocence. Unlike in a full-blown trial, a hearing for bail is summary in nature: it deliberately “avoid[s] unnecessary thoroughness” and does not try the merits of the case. Thus:
Summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.(Emphasis in the original)
Here, the prosecution itself has acknowledged that “the first order denying bail is an interlocutory order.”The merits of the case for kidnapping must still be threshed out in a full-blown proceeding.
Being an interlocutory order, the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision denying Escobar’s First Bail Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has not attained finality. Since res judicata has not attached to the March 8, 2011 Court of Appeals Decision, the Regional Trial Court should have taken cognizance of Escobar’s Second Bail Petition and weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.
In any case, the Court of Appeals may still reverse its Decision, notwithstanding its denial of the First Bail Petition on March 8, 2011.
Rules of procedure should not be interpreted as to disadvantage a party and deprive him or her of fundamental rights and liberties. A judgment or order may be modified where executing it in its present form is impossible or unjust in view of intervening facts or circumstances:
[W]here facts and circumstances transpire which render [the] execution [of a judgment] impossible or unjust and it therefore becomes necessary, “in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances.”(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Appellate courts may correct “errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.”Thus, an accused may file a second petition for bail, particularly if there are sudden developments or a “new matter or fact which warrants a different view.”
Rolando’s release on bail is a new development in Escobar’s case.The Court of Appeals has pointed out that the other alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail: Rolando, in particular, was granted bail because Cubillas’ testimony against him was weak. “[Escobar] and [Rolando] participated in the same way, but [Escobar]’s bail was denied. Escobar’s fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the meantime.
Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The same evidence used by the trial court to grant bail to Rolando was not used similarly in Escobar’s favor. As the Court of Appeals found:
We cannot ignore the allegation of conspiracy and that the other accused were all granted bail except him. Specifically, [Rolando] was granted bail due to the weakness of Cubillas’ testimony against him.
In light of the circumstances after the denial of Escobar’s First Bail Petition, his Second Bail Petition should have been given due course. It should not be denied on the technical ground of res judicata.
II
The Court of Appeals already approved Escobar’s bail petition. Meanwhile, City Jail Warden Latoza has informed this Court of the absence of any temporary restraining order against the Court of Appeals Decision granting the Second Bail Petition, as well as the Regional Trial Court Order fixing his bail at P300,000.00. Thus, the Court of Appeals March 24, 2014 Decision granting Escobar’s provisional liberty can be executed upon the approval of his bail bond, if he has indeed paid the surety bond.
In closing, no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional evidence for the prosecution to prove Escobar’s guilt in the main case. “[A] grant of bail does not prevent the trier of facts . . . from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.” As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
[T]his determination is only for the purpose of bail[;] it is without prejudice for the prosecution to submit additional evidence to prove [Escobar]’s guilt in the course of the proceedings in the primary case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 24, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 128189 is AFFIRMED.
Escobar may be provisionally released if he indeed has paid the surety bond that must be contained in a public document and approved by the Regional Trial Court judge. Otherwise, he is directed to post bail.
SO ORDERED.
LEONEN, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Mendoza, and Martires, JJ., concur.
G. R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL ESCOBAR, RESPONDENT.
Citations omitted.