Art. 34 of the Family Code, and Article 76 of the Civil Code, exempts from the requirement to secure a marriage license the parties who had been living together as husband and wife without the benefits of marriage, for at least five years prior to the day of the marriage. The five-year period must be characterised with exclusivity, meaning, no other person was involved; that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; the parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years; and the solemnising officer must also execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
What is the effect if the parties did not meet the five-year cohabitation period prior to the marriage, contrary to those stated in their Affidavit of Cohabitation?
Jose and Felisa, in their marriage certificate, executed an affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
In his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to Felisa alleging that his marriage to Felisa was secured through fraud, Jose alleged that he was introduced to Felisa in 1986 and lived as a boarder in her house; three weeks later or on November 24, 1986, she asked him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall allegedly to pick up a package sent by her brother; thereat, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them and made him sign the papers so they could claim the package; he refused, but Felisa begged him to sign it as her brother might get mad as he had already learned of their relationship; he signed the pieces of paper. After one year, he discovered that he had married Felisa when he discovered the pieces of paper in the room. Felisa denied Jose’s allegations, and averred that he filed the petition in order to evade administrative and criminal liability after she discovered that Jose married another woman.
The RTC refused to believe Jose’a allegations and dismissed the complaint. It refused to believe that Jose did not know of his marriage to Felisa, considering that in the documents he submitted to the authorities, he indicated therein that his wife is Felisa. It also ruled that fraud as a ground for annulment has prescribed in Jose’s case, as the same prescribes four years after its discovery.
Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA at first affirmed the RTC decision, but Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In his motion Jose argued that that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
In an Amended Decision, the CA reversed itself, and citing the case of Ninal vs Badayog, ruled that the as Jose and Felisa did not comply with the five-year requirement for cohabitation which exempted them from securing a marriage license under Art. 76 of the Civil Code, the falsity of such affidavit rendered their marriage without license, and thus void from the very beginning.
Both the Republic and Felisa appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
What is the effect of a false affidavit of cohabitation when a marriage is celebrated without license?
The Ruling:
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that “they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.” One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years – and continuity that is unbroken.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Citations omitted.