Penalty for Qualified Theft when amounts exceeds the threshold amount provided under Article 309, as amended. – “ In People v. Cañales, the Court ruled that the penalty for qualified theft under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, taking into account the value of the property stolen, is reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty of death, with no possibility of pardon before the lapse of forty years[1]
Unlike in Simple Theft where the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years, in Qualified Theft, such limitation does not exist.[2]
“Article 309 was amended by Republic Act 10951 (RA 10951) approved August 29, 2017. As amended, Article 309 now reads:
Article 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by”
- The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00) but does not exceed Two million two hundred thousand pesos (P2,200,000.00); but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one (1) year for each additional One million pesos (P1,000,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
In the application of the provision, Hernan v. Sandiganbayan and OCA Circular No. 179-2018 which decreed:
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsel, and such other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expedience, further directs the appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather than an original petition filed for a similar purpose.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
Verily, for purposes of determining whether respondent is entitled to bail as a matter of right, the prescribed penalty follows the computation as provided under Article 309 as amended.[3]
While the accused committed the crime prior to the enactment of RA 10951, the newly enacted law expressly provides for retroactive effect if it is favorable to the accused.[4]
“Anent the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, the Court agrees with the RTC that the petitioner’s extrajudicial confession through the handwritten letter coupled with her act of surrendering the redeemed pawn tickets and thereafter going to the police station can be taken as an analogous circumstance of voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraph 1077 in relation to paragraph 778 of the RPC.”[5]
[1] People v. Hu, G.R. No. 158064, June 30, 2005, citing People v. Canales, G.R. No. 133028, July 10, 2000
[2] San Diego v. People, G.R. No. 176114, April 8, 2015
[3] Daigle v. Cruz, G.R. No. 246914, citing Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, 822 Phil. 148, and Decision dated July 31, 2018 in G.R. No. 237721
[4] Deunas v. People, G.R. no. 211701, January 11, 2023
[5] People v. Fronteras, G.R. No. 190583, December 7, 2015