Cybelibel is not a new crime. – The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.[1]
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code does not include “online defamation”- “Reading Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, “similar means” could not have included “online defamation” under the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis. Under this rule, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible to various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.
In Article 355, the associated words are “writing,” “printing,” “litography,” “engraving,” “radio,” “phonograph,” “painting,” “theatrical exhibition,” and “cinematic exhibition,” clearly excluding “computer systems or other similar means which may be derived in the future” specifically added in Article 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. If it were true that Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code already includes libel made through computer systems, then Congress had no need to legislate Article 4( c )(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, for the latter legal provisions will be superfluous. That Congress had to legislate Article 4 (c )(4) means that libel done through computer system, i.e. cyber libel, is an additional means of committing libel, punishable only under the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
For these reasons, an allegedly libelous Facebook post made may only be punished under the Cybercrime Prevention Act, not under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the Facebook post complained of was made in 2001, a year before the Cybercrime Prevention Act was passed, there was no libel punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. The prosecution in this case correctly withdrew the information it had filed with the trial court.” (Citations omitted)[2]
RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implements the RPC’s provisions on libel when written defamatory remarks are published through a computer system. – “XX. Section 4(c ) (4) of RA 10175 merely implements the RPC’s provisions on Libel under Articles 353 and 355 thereof when it is committed through a computer system. Thus, in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, the RPC, not Act No. 3326, should be applied.
First, a textual analysis of Section 4 ( c )(4) of RA 10175 readily reveals that the special law did not create any new crime. Instead, it merely enforces Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC on Libel when committed “through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.” Verily, in defining the act to be punished, RA 10175 itself refers to Article 355 of the RPC, viz.:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
X x x x x
© Content-related Offenses:
X X X X
(4) Libel. – The unlawful or prohibited acts as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. (Italics supplied)
Second, the Court could not have been more categorical in its Disini Decision: Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section 4 ( c ) (4) of Ra 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and the same crime with the same elements. RA 10175 simply recognizes a computer system as “similar means” of publication and makes the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in the commission of the Libel as a qualifying circumstance:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4 9 c ) (4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.
X x x x
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the Internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
X x x x
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4 ( c) (4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4 (c ) (4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4 © (4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription under double jeopardy.
In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the Disini Decision, the Court reiterated that Cyber Libel is not a new crime for it is essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace.
Finally, even the lawmakers recognized that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of cyber or online Libel because it is already defined by the RPC. In passing Section 4 ( c ) (4) of Ra 10175, they acknowledged that the RPC is a very old law dating back to the Spanish occupation, where the legislators could not have contemplated the use of technologies not yet existing at that time, such as a computer system, to publish libelous statements. With RA 10175, the law recognizes computer systems and ICT as novel means of committing libel. Thus, by including a specific RPC provision in RA 10175, the legislators intended to implement existing laws on Libel when the defamatory remarks are made online, which are “just online versions of actual criminal activities in the real world.”
The foregoing irrefragrably shows that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of Cyber Libel but merely enforces the felony of Libel as already defined and penalized by Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, when it is committed with the use of a computer system as a means of publishing libelous statements and increases the penalty for Libel by one degree higher than that prescribed by the RPC when the crime is committed with the use of ICT. Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by the RPC.[3]
Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC, not Section 1 of Act. No. 3326, define the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. – Considering that Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by the RPC, the latter governs in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.
Act No. 3326 is not controlling because Section 1, in relation to Section 3 thereof, makes the said law applicable only if the offense is defined and penalized by a special law without its own prescriptive period, and not when the crime is already defined and penalized by the RPC.
Even assuming arguendo that Cyber Libel is considered as an offense that is defined and penalized by Section 4 ( c ) (4) of RA 10175, a special law without its own prescriptive period, the law’s direct reference to Article 355 of the RPC precludes the automatic application of Act No. 3326 to define its prescriptive period. Instead, the Court must examine both Section 1, Act No. 3326 and Article 90 of the RPC, determine which statutory provision has the shortest prescriptive period and is most favorable to the accuse, and apply the latter in setting the prescription of Cyber Libel. This is based on the settled rule that statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes must be construed in favor of the accused.
X X X
X X X
Here, Cyber Libel is penalized under Section 4 ( c ) (4) of RA 10175, but the same section of the law also refers to Article 355 of the RPC to define the prohibited act. Following Terrado, either Section 1, Act No. 3326 or Article 90 of the RPC may be applied to determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel; as between the two, the law that sets the shorter period for prescription and the more favorable to accused must be applied. Considering that Article 90 of the RPC provides the shorter prescriptive period at only year and is therefore more favorable to the accused, it should prevail over the application of Act. 3326, which would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 12 years.[4]
Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, making the crime of Cyber Libel prescribe in one year; thus the ruling in Tolentino must be abandoned. –
“The Court agrees with Causing and abandons the Tolentino doctrine on the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. To emphasize, what governs the prescription of Cyber Libel is paragraph 4, not paragraph 2, of Article 90 of the RPC. Hence, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year.
First, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be given its literal and plain meaning: the crime of Libel shall prescribe in one year. This provision must therefore determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, consistent with the Court’s finding that Section 4 (c ) (4) of RA 10175 is the same crime of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC when it is committed through a computer system.
Indeed, laws are presumed to have been passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all statues existing on the subject. By referencing Article 355 of the RPC in RA 10175, the lawmakers are presumed to know all laws bearing on Libel, including the applicable provisions of the RPC on the period for its prescription. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to exclude Cyber Libel from the crime of “libel” in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, it would have used the appropriate language to do so, but it did not. The absence of any such amendatory or exclusionary clause warrants the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to create a prescriptive period for Cyber Libel that is different from what is already provided in Article 90 of the RPC for Libel under Article 355 of the same Code.
Second, it is an elementary rule in statutory construction that a special and specific provision of law prevails over a general provision of the same law irrespective of their relative position in the statute. (Generalia specialibus non derogant) Where there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. This rule has been applied by the Court in fixing the prescriptive period for an action for breach of warranty, for a response to be filed in deficiency tax assessment cases, and for the duration of a contract.
In the present case, a perusal of Article 90 of the RPC readily shows that paragraph 2 thereof is a general provision on prescription of crimes punishable by afflictive penalties, while paragraph 4 specifically governs Libel or other similar offenses. Applying the foregoing rule on statutory construction, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC indisputably prevails over paragraph 2 thereof in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.
Third, the history of the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 90 of the RPC discloses the Legislature’s intent to set it apart from other crimes punishable with a correctional penalty. When the RPC was passed, the prescriptive period of libel was two years. Congress further reduced the period by passing RA 4661, which amended Article 90 of the RPC to specifically shorten the prescriptive and other similar offenses from two years to one year.
Significantly, the Court has held that the prescription of a crime is intimately connected with and depends upon the gravity of the offense. Hence, a reduction or shortening of the prescriptive period “implies an acknowledgment on the part of the sovereign power that the greater severity of the former statute relative to the substances of the criminal action is unjust.” Excepting Libel from the general 10-year prescriptive period for other crimes with correctional penalties may therefore be taken as an acknowledgment by the Legislature that it is “less grave” compared to other crimes at the penal scale.
In addition, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, RA 4661, which originated from House Bill No. 1037 (HB 1037), was enacted by the Legislature to synchronize the prescriptive period of Libel with the one-year prescriptive period of civil actions for defamations under Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Apart from this, Senator Lorenzo Tanada, who sponsored HB 1037,mentioned that a shorter prescriptive period for Libel will especially benefit the members of the press by allowing them to “discharge their functions better.” These very same rationales remain true to this day and equally apply to the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.
Given the foregoing, the Court cannot subscribe to the classification of Cyber Libel as a crime punishable with an afflictive penalty under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC that would increase its prescriptive period to 15 years. Such interpretation disregards the clear intent of the lawmakers to set Libel apart form the general class of crimes punishable with afflictive or correctional penalties. Absent any amendment of the statute clearly raising the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, or an enactment on the prescription of said crime that is different form that provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, the Court must apply the latter.
Finally, it bears repeating that in interpreting statutory provisions on the prescription of crimes, what is more favorable to the accused must be adopted. Hence, when there are several conflicting provisions of the RPC in classifying the penalty for a felony as light, correctional, or afflictive, in relation to Article 90 of the same Code, the Court must adopt the interpretation of the law that sets the shortest prescriptive period. In the present case, consistent with the foregoing principle of liberality in favor of the accused, there is no doubt that paragraph 4, Article 90 lf the RPC prevails over paragraph 2 thereof as the latter would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 15 years instead of just one.[5] (Citations omitted)
Pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC, the crime of Cyber Libel prescribes in one year from its discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.- “Upon a careful evaluation of the foregoing cases, the Court holds that the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC and Cyber Libel under Section 4 ( c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, must be counted from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court affirms its ruling in Alcantara that prescription is counted from discovery of the published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, because they could hardly be expected to institute criminal proceedings for Libel without prior knowledge of the same. This is more in keeping with Article 91 of the RPC.
The prescriptive period may be reckoned from the publication of the libelous matter only
When it coincides with the date of discovery by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Verily, although Gines and Syhunliong reckoned prescription from the date of publication, offended parties in the said cases did not allege a later date of discovery different from the publication date. It thus appears that in these two cases, the publication and discovery dates are one and the same, or at the very least, have been impliedly admitted to be the same by the offended parties therein.” [6]
PENALTY
On whether or not the RTC may impose the penalty of fine for online libel. – “XX, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, that as worded, both the RPC and RA 10175 prescribe the penalty of imprisonment or a fine for the crimes of Traditional Libel and Online Libel, depending on the circumstances present in each case. Both statutes did not alter the character of the penalties of imprisonment and fine as alternatives to each other, or as concurrent penalties, in cases of Online Libel or Libel.”[7]
Fine imposable as penalty may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty – Relevantly, the RPC recognizes that the penalty of fine may be imposed as a single or alternative penalty,32 which means it can be imposed in lieu of imprisonment, as obviously shown by the fact that the RPC provides for the alternative penalty of fine in many of its provisions.33 Specifically on libel, the penalty of fine may also be imposed in the alternative, which is evident in the RPC’s plain use of the disjunctive word “or” between the term of imprisonment and fine, such word signaling disassociation or independence between the two words.34
Petitioner appears to conclude that Section 6 mandates imprisonment as a penalty for Online Libel because it provides that the penalty shall be “one degree higher than that provided in the [RPC].” Thus, petitioner erroneously assumes that only imprisonment may be increased or decreased by degrees under the RPC. Verily, petitioner’s argument is belied by Article 75 of the RPC which provides:
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more degrees. – Whenever it may be necessary to increase or reduce the penalty of fine by one or more degrees, it shall be increased or reduced, respectively, for each degree, by one-fourth of the maximum amount prescribed by law, without however, changing the minimum.
The same rules shall be observed with regard to fines that do not consist of a fixed amount, but are made proportional. (Underscoring supplied)
From this, the Court finds that there is no legal basis for petitioner to argue that: (a) a penalty of fine may not be imposed in the case of Online Libel; and (b) Section 6 speaks only of imprisonment when it provided for a penalty one degree higher than that provided in the RPC. Clearly, Articles 26, 75, and 355 of the RPC provide that the penalty of fine may be imposed instead of imprisonment and it may be increased or decreased by degree”[8]
The proper penalty for online libel. – “Section 6 of RA 10175 provides that if a penalty of fine is imposed for online libel, it must be one degree higher than that imposed by the RPC. Following Article 75 of the RPC, each degree shall be one-fourth of the maximum amount set by law. Pertinently, the Court, through Associate Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, applied this rule in the case of De los Angeles v. People of the Philippines (De los Angeles),37 where, in ascertaining the correct amount of fine to be imposed for an attempted felony, it determined that each degree shall be one-fourth of the maximum amount provided by law.
In this case, then, upon dividing the maximum amount of fine—₱1,200,000.00—into four parts (one-fourth of the maximum amount set by law), each degree amounts to ₱300,000.00. Then, in order to determine the penalty one degree higher, the amount of ₱300,000.00 shall be added to the maximum amount stated in the amended Article 355 of the RPC. Thus, the maximum amount of fine for online libel shall be ₱1,500,000.00 (₱1,200,000.00 + ₱300,000.00). Further, the minimum shall be unchanged at ₱40,000.00, following Article 75 of the RPC. Finally, the range of the penalty of fine for online libel shall be from ₱40,000.00 to ₱1,500,000.00. Hence, the fine imposed by the RTC at P50,000.00 is within the range imposable by the law.
The Court also emphasizes that, because the minimum and maximum amounts of fine are fixed by law for traditional and consequently, for online libel, then, for the purpose of reducing the amount of fine by degrees, the minimum shall remain unchanged, as the Court ruled in De los Angeles and as provided by Article 75 of the RPC.
Further, considering that RA 10175 imposes upon online libel a penalty that is one (1) degree higher than traditional libel, then the maximum penalty of fine is ₱1,500,000.00. For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, the Court holds that, in the event that it shall be necessary to reduce the penalty of fine for online libel by one (1) degree, then the maximum penalty for online libel shall be reduced by one-fourth (₱1,500,000.00 / 4 = ₱375,000.00). Hence, the range of the penalty shall be ₱40,000.00, as minimum, to ₱1,125,000.00, as maximum. If by two (2) degrees, then the minimum shall also remain unchanged, but the maximum shall be further reduced by another one-fourth of the original maximum penalty. Hence the range of penalty shall be ₱40,000.00 to ₱750,000.00.
At this juncture, the Court is mindful of the fact that the IRR of RA 10175 explicitly states a different range of fines as a penalty for online libel, as follows:
Section 5. Other Cybercrimes. – The following constitute other cybercrime offenses punishable under the Act:
x x x x
3. Libel – The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel, as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future shall be punished with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period or a fine ranging from Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) up to the maximum amount determined by Court, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party: Provided, That this provision applies only to the original author of the post or on line libel, and not to others who simply receive the post and react to it. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court also recognizes that as worded, the penalty of imprisonment in the IRR for online libel is indeed one degree higher than that provided in the RPC. The fine in the IRR, however, retained the old amount stated in Article 355 of the RPC, without increasing the maximum amount by one degree in accordance with Article 75. Additionally, as stated earlier, Article 355 of the RPC was amended by RA 10951 in 2017.38 Thus, the passage of RA 10951, and with it, the adjustment of the amount of the fine imposed for libel and other crimes, created a variance between the penalties in Section 6 of RA 10175 and Section 5 of its IRR.
In determining the correct penalty for online libel, the Court finds that the express provision in Section 6 of RA 10175 is controlling than Section 5 of the law’s IRR, whose authority for issuance is delegated by the law itself.39 Settled jurisprudence dictates that implementing rules and regulations should not go against or beyond the law it seeks to implement. Thus, in case of a conflict between the law and its IRR, the law prevails.40 As the offense in this case was committed on January 23, 2018, the courts must apply Section 6 of RA 10175 in relation to the RPC’s penalty for libel in its amended form in force at the time the offense was committed.[9]
Applicability Of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 to Online Libel. – The Circular does not supplant the legislative intent behind the imposition of a higher degree of penalty in online libel. To be clear, in no way does it mandate the imposition of fine only in libel cases. In fact, with due deference to prevailing statutes, it is careful to emphasize that it does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty.
Therefore, courts should take note that in the imposition of penalty for libel/on-line libel, they should bear in mind the principles laid down in the Circular, as follows:
1. [AC 08-2008] does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment. (Underscoring supplied)[10]
Venue. – “Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.”[11]
The above ruling in Bonifacio, which was promulgated before the passage of R.A. 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), should be understood in light of Section 2.1 of the Rule on Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC).96 However, the basic point of Bonifacio still applies to radio broadcasts: the Information must allege with particularity the location of the radio station transmitting the broadcast. We agree with Henares that similar to our observation in Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court97 that newspapers have editorial and business offices, the radio and television stations also have physical offices where libelous statements can be broadcasted or transmitted from. Their locations shall serve as the venue for actions for defamation committed through said radio or television stations.
If the prosecution is unable allege the situs of first publication with sufficient specificity, then it is better to use the private offended party’s residence at the time of the offense as basis for the venue of the action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was first published.“[12] (Citation omitted)
Venue according to the Rule on Cybercrime warrants. – Section 2.1. Venue of Criminal Actions. – The criminal actions for violation of Section 4 (Cybercrime offenses) and/or Section 5 (Other offenses), Chapter II of RA 10175, shall be filed before the designated cybercrime court of the province or city where the offense or any of its elements is committed where any part of the computer system used is situated, or where any of the damage caused to a natural or juridical person took place: Provided, that the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other courts.[13]
[1] Disini , et al v. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014
[2] Penalosa v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 230299, April 26, 2023
[3] Causing v. People of the Philippines, et. Al., ,G.R. no. 258524, October 11, 2023
[4] Causing v. People of the Philippines, et. Al., ,G.R. no. 258524, October 11, 2023
[5] Causing v. People of the Philippines, et. Al., ,G.R. no. 258524, October 11, 2023
[6] Causing v. People of the Philippines, et. Al., ,G.R. no. 258524, October 11, 2023
[7] People v. Soliman G.R. No. 256700, April 25, 2023
[8] People v. Soliman G.R. No. 256700, April 25, 2023
[9] People v. Soliman G.R. No. 256700, April 25, 2023
[10] People v. Soliman G.R. No. 256700, April 25, 2023
[11] Bonifacio, et al v. RTC of Makati Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010, cited in Tieng v. Hon. Selma Palacio-alaras, G.R. no. 164846, July 13, 2021
[12] Tieng v. Hon. Selma Palacio-alaras, G.R. no. 164846, July 13, 2021
[13] Sec. 2.1., Rule on Cybercrime Warrants, A.M. No. 17-11-03-SC