Inherent and natural right of parents over their children. – “There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that “(f)amily relations include those . . . (2) (b)etween parents and children; . . . .” Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the “natural and primary rights” of parents in the rearing of the youth.There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.[1] (Citations omitted)
Art. 213 of the Family Code applies when the parents are separated. – “This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.“(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their mother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother’s loving care.”[2] (citations omitted)
“When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms[3]
Generally, the law favors the mother in custody cases. – In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mother’s love and devotion for which there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined. The Civil Code Commission, in recommending the preference for the mother, explained, thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation.[4](Citations omitted)
The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that “No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.” The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation.” (Report of the Code Commission, p. 12).
The use of the word shall2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.[5]
“It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a mother whose attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first year. The mother’s role in the life of her child, such as Ray II, is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the depth of a mother’s love has been immortalized times without number, finding as it does, its justification, not in fantasy but in reality.[6]
X”X. in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.”[7]
“xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.36 As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
“xxx
“The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.[8]
Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into consideration the circumstances that would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the children. Although we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the children’s needs.[9]
Enforceability of an agreement by separated spouses for joint custody of a minor below 7 years old. – The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.[10] (Citations omitted)
Article 213 applies to court-sanctioned custodial arrangements as well as private agreements. –“ It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” To limit this provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age “to avoid a t ragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.” This ignores the legislative basis that “[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age.” ([11]Citations omitted)
“It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents. However, these are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt.”[12]
“XX- the issue pertaining to the right of a child to choose which parent he prefers to live with. The reason as to why this statement should be understood in said manner is actually not difficult to discern: the choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 0f the Rules of Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only between married parents because, they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. On the other hand, this choice is not available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as Queenie (second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole parental authority is given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the Family Code). Thus, since the issue in this case is the application of the exception to the tender-age presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, and not the option given to the child under the first paragraph to choose which parent to live with, petitioners’ reliance on Gualberto-Pablo is grossly misplaced.”[13]
Second paragraph of Article 213 does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children. – “In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which was the basis of the CA’s directive to remand the case, does not even distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children – and hence, does not factor in whether or not the parents are married – in declaring that “[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” Ubi lex non distingu,it nee nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.”[14]
Best interests of the child a primary consideration. – “The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration. Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on the children’s well-being and development. Aside from the material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children. Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; as well as the children’s emotional and educational needs.” [15](Citations omitted)
“Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual development. The threat may be proven empty, but Shirley has a right to a wholesome family life that will provide her with love, care and understanding, guidance and counseling. and moral and material security. 7 But what if the threat is for real.?”[16]
“It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court diverted from that criterion.”[17]
“The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter’ s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, “there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.”
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. The child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.”[18] (Citations omitted)
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.[19]
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents’ demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child’s custody. While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their families.[20]
Custody over illegitimate children. – “Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the minor. Even way back, Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount.68 Under present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC explicitly states that “[i]n awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor and shall give paramount consideration to [her] material and moral welfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor encouraging to [her] physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor.”[21]
“The Court cannot close its eyes to the sad reality that not all fathers, especially those who have sired children out of wedlock, have risen to the full height of a parent’s responsibility towards his offspring. Yet, here is a father of an illegitimate child who is very much willing to take on the whole gamut of parenting. He, thus, deserves, at the very least, to be given his day in court to prove that he is entitled to regain custody of his daughter.”[22]
It should be stressed that Section 15 of’ A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody, as follows:
Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. – The court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate visitation rights to the non-custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or disqualified.
The temporary custodian shall give the court and non-custodial parent or parents at least five days’ notice of any plan to change the residence of the minor or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent or parents.
It is only after trial, when the court renders its judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party, that the court may likewise issue “any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody,” pursuant to Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, to wit:
Section 18. Judgment. – After trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor. ·
If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of such minor, or to commit him to any suitable home for children.
In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its custodian. In determining the amount of support, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of living the minor has been accustomed to; and ( 4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents would make toward the care and well-being of the minor.
The court may also issue any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody. (Emphasis supplied)
By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James’ bare allegations, to which the Court cannot give its imprimatur.”[23]
“Tender-age” presumption under Art. 213– The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.”[24] (Citations omitted.)
“The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child’s interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.[25]
“In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by “compelling reasons”. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.[26]
“While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.[27]
“Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under “compelling reasons” is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.”[28]
“Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, however, Article 176 of the Family Code stats that illegitimate children shall e under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Genevie) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as Jecielle Rose and Jeah), notwithstanding the father’s recognition. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother’s unfitness to exercise such authority and care.[29]
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.[30]
“Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.[31]
Family Code applies when determining qualification of a non-Muslim mother. – The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim laws. The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code now that she is not a Muslim.[32]
“Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children,31 and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents[33]
“In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose “father” is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.[34]
Adoption without the consent of the parent who did not abandon his children will not be allowed. – Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis-à-vis that of their children are not antithetical to each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.[35]
“This court should avert the tragedy in the years to come of having deprived mother and son of the beautiful associations and tender, imperishable memories engendered by the relationship of parent and child. We should not take away from a mother the opportunity of bringing up her own child even at the cost of extreme sacrifice due to poverty and lack of means; so that afterwards, she may be able to look back with pride and a sense of satisfaction at her sacrifices and her efforts, however humble, to make her dreams of her little boy come true. We should not forget that the relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. If the child turns out to be a failure or forgetful of what its foster parents had done for him, said parents might yet count and appraise (sic) all that they have done and spent for him and with regret consider all of it as a dead loss, and even rue the day they committed the blunder of taking the child into their hearts and their home. Not so with a real natural mother who never counts the cost and her sacrifices, ever treasuring memories of her associations with her child, however unpleasant and disappointing. Flesh and blood count. . . . .[36]
Conventional wisdom and common human experience show that a “bad” husband does not necessarily make a “bad” father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children. Petitioner has demonstrated his love and concern for his children when he took the trouble of sending a telegram to the lower court expressing his intention to oppose the adoption immediately after learning about it. He traveled back to this country to attend to the case and to testify about his love for his children and his desire to unite his family once more in the United States”[37] (Citation omitted)
[1] Silva v. CA, G.R. No. 114742, July 17, 1997
[2] Pablo-Gualberto v. CA, G.R. no. 154994, June 28, 2005
[3] Perez v. CA, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
[4] Sy v. CA, G.R No. 124518, December 27, 2007
[5] Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, G.R. no. L-23482, August 30, 1968
[6] Perez v. CA, G.R. No. 118870, March 29, 1996
[7] Sagara-Eslao v. CA, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
[8] Sagara-Eslao v. CA, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
[9] Bondagjy v. BondagJy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
[10] Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010
[11] Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010
[12] Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010
[13] Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[14] Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[15] Pablo-Gualberto v. CA, G.R. no. 154994, June 28, 2005
[16] Luna v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68734, June 18, 1985
[17] Unson III v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-52242, November 17, 1980
[18] Santos, Sr., V. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
[19] Santos, Sr., V. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
[20] Santos, Sr., V. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
[21] Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[22] Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[23] Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[24] Pablo-Gualberto v. CA, G.R. no. 154994, June 28, 2005
[25] Espiritu v. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[26] Espiritu v. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[27] Espiritu v. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[28] Espiritu v. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
[29] Alag, Jr. V, Villamor, G.R. No. 250849, March 9, 2020, citing Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
[30] Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
[31] David v. CA, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
[32] Bondagjy v. BondagJy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
[33] Bondagjy v. BondagJy, G.R. No. 140817, December 7, 2001
[34] In the matter of the petition for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus of minor Angelie Anne C. Cervantes, Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, January 27, 1999
[35] Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
[36] Celis v. Cafuir, 86 Phil. 554 (1950) cited in Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
[37] Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998