Facts:
The petitioners filed a case against Atty. Luis, counsel of record of Ernesto. Ernesto was charged with qualified theft and a warrant of arrest has been issued against him. In order to file a motion for reconsideration, Ernesto’s pleading needed to verified or notarized, and it was in this capacity that Atty. Luis meet him at her office to have the Motion for Reconsideration notarized the document. In filing a case for obstruction of justice against Atty. Luis, the petitioners averred that Atty. Luis and her associate should have effected a citizen’s arrest against Ernesto, or reported the presence of Ernesto in her office in order for the relevant authorities to arrest him.
The case was eventually filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, where Atty. Luis filed a motion to quash the Information, On motion for reconsideration, the handling judge granted it, ruling that petitioners failed to present proof that Atty. Luis assisted Ernesto with the sole purpose of helping him evade prosecution or delay the administration of justice.
Their petition for certiorari denied by the RTC, the petitioners elevated their case to the RTC on pure question of law.
Issues:
Is Atty. Luis liable for violation of Presidential Decree 1829, the law penalizing obstruction of justice?
What acts are punishable under PD 1829?
Ruling.
Petition denied.
The Court cited the MeTC reading of the law that Atty. Luis cannot be held liable for obstruction of justice:
“In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Luis, the MeTC under Judge Runes-Tamang found that “[h]arboring a criminal presupposes something deliberate and not just the simple act of not voluntarily giving information to the authorities as to the present whereabouts of a person.” It thereafter declared that absent a clear showing of an overt act evidencing intent to help. The fugitive remain in violation of the law, the charge for obstruction of justice would have no leg to stand on.
The Court agrees. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions before the RTC, we find the MeTC’s reading to be consistent with the text of Section 1 ( c ) of P.D. No. 1829 which explicitly makes the intention to frustrate or delay apprehension, prosecution and conviction of another an element of the offense.
Here, there was absolutely no showing that Ernesto’s presence in Atty. Luis’s office was for anything other than to sign a Motion for Reconsideration and have it subscribed and sworn to before said counsel. That Atty. Luis did not take any steps to arrest Ernesto or report his presence in her office to the authorities, without more, does not evince an unmistakable intent on her part to help him evade prosecution or delay the administration of justice. In fact, and as correctly pointed out by Atty. Luis, had her intention been to “harbor” or “conceal” Ernesto, she would have asked to meet “in a secluded place unknown to anyone” instead of asking him to come to her notarial office which is not only known to petitioners, but also open to the public and located in the very business district of Ortigas, Pasig City.”
What acts are penalized by P.D. No. 1829?
“P.D. No. 1829 punishes acts knowingly and willfully committed with the intention to obstruct, impede, frustrate ore delay the administration of justice. Petitioners’ suggested reading of the provision, on the other hand, seeks to impose a positive duty on the part of anyone who may have knowledge of a fugitive’s whereabouts (including his lawyer) to arrest him or volunteer such information to the authorities. Failing this, they will be liable for obstruction of justice under Section 1 ( c ), lack of intent to obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the proceedings notwithstanding. Their reading, however, cannot be sustained as it is incompatible with the letter of the law, basic statutory construction or basic criminal law precepts.
The insidious effect of petitioners’ suggested reading of Section 1 ( c ) of P.D. no. 1829 becomes even more apparent if one considers the lawyer-client relationship between Ernesto and Atty. Luis. As correctly pointed out by Atty. Luis, allowing the obstruction of justice charge against her to prosper would have the effect of defeating Ernesto’s constitutional rights to counsel and to be presumed-innocent. He would be hard pressed to find a lawyer to render legal services to him, if, in doing, they knew they risk opening themselves up to an obstruction of. Justice charge. Lawyers, on the other hand, would have to choose between self-preservation or violating their fiduciary duty to a client.
Indeed, a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. This duty to the courts, however, must be balanced with the lawyer’s obligations toward their client. This, among other things, is why evidence of criminal intent is essential. We quote with approval the following explanation of the MeTC:
The countervailing duty of a lawyer to our system of law is not to divulge matter covered by the confidentiality rule between him and his client but that he cannot counsel the fugitive to remain in violation of the law. Had only there been evidence presented by the complainant in support of their mere allegations in the complaint-affidavit that the accused actually aided or assisted an accused client in keeping away from the reach of the authorities with the sole purpose of evading prosecution or delaying the administration of justice, the charge of Obstruction of Justice would have a leg to stand on. More than a criminal charge, accused Luis could have also been liable administratively for violating the Canon of Professional Ethics. But such is not the case at bar.” (Citations omitted)
DR. EMILY D. DE LEON, DR. MA. CORAZON RAMONA LL. DE LOS SANTOS, DEAN ATTY. JOE-SANTOS B. BISQUERA, ATTY. DIOSDADO G. MADRID AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. JUDITH Z. LUIS, RESPONDENT., G.R. No. 226236, July 6, 2021