Facts:
AAA filed a case for libel against BBB, alleging that the latter made defamatory and libelous allegations in his Petition to Cancel and Deny Due to AAA’s nomination as party-list nominee before the COMELEC. The RTC and the CA both convicted him of libel. In ratiocinating its decision, the RTC opined that the pleading containing the libelous allegation was made not in response to a moral or social duty but merely to injure AAA’s reputation. Moreover, there was no hearing or judicial proceeding before the COMELEC at the time petitioner filed the pleading, hence his statements cannot be considered privileged.
Issue:
Whether or not the protection of absolute privileged communications in judicial proceedings apply to quasi-judicial proceedings.
Ruling:
“While originally applied to “traditional litigation.” American courts have expanded the reach of absolute privilege to quasi-judicial proceedings. This privilege which protects actions required or permitted in the course of a quasi-judicial proceedings also embraces steps necessarily preliminary to such a proceeding. To qualify as quasi-judicial and for statements made therein to be absolutely privileged, a proceedings must afford procedural protections similar to those provided by the judicial process, i.e. notice and opportunity to be present, informations as to charges made and opportunity to controvert them, the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to submit evidence on one’s behalf, and to be heard in person, and the presence of an objective decisionmaker. The number of proceedings deemed quasi-judicial, however, does not mean that this status and its absolute privilege are lightly granted. American courts have withheld recognition where there is inadequate assurance of procedural safeguards. Even if absolute community is not warranted due to failure to meet one or more requisites, the alternative thereto need not be no immunity at all. A qualified privilege, which requires a demonstration of the absence of malice, is the wiser policy and would adequately protect the interests of all parties concerned.
In our jurisdiction, a quasi-judicial prceedings has been defined as the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. It involves: (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining the facts based upon the evidence presented and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. In other words, it involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties.
Having applied the absolute privilege to statements given during judicial and administrative proceedings, and even preliminary investigations, We see no reason not to apply it to statements given in quasi-judicial proceedings. However, whereas the lone requirement imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is the test of relevancy, applying such privilege in quasi-judicial proceedings additionally requires that they provide procedural protections similar to those in judicial proceedings.
Thus, We lay down the following four==fold test to determine whether to apply absolute privilege to statements made in the course of quasi-judicial; proceedings, or in steps necessarily preliminary thereto:
- Quasi-judicial powers test: Was the document containing the alleged defamatory statement filed or submitted as a necessarily preliminary step to or during a quasi-judicial proceeding?
- Safeguards test: Does the proceeding afford procedural protections similar to those provided by the judicial process?
- Relevancy test: Was the alleged defamatory statement relevant and pertinent to such proceeding?
- Non-publication test: Was the document containing the alleged defamatory statement communicated by the author only to those who have a duty to perform with respect to it and to those legally required to served a copy thereof?
As to the quasi-judicial powers test, We have held that the denial of due course or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy calls for the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions. By analogy, the very nature of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of nomination of party-list nominees calls for the exercise of its judicial functions.
Anent the safeguards test, this analysis serves to protect all interests involved in a proceeding. While the proceedings in a petition to deny due course course or to cancel a certificate of nomination of party-list nominees are summary in nature, procedural safeguards of due notice and hearing and an opportunity to controvert the charges and submit evidence are not dispensed with. Parties may also be allowed to cross=examine affiants.
As to the relevancy test, courts have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving doubts in favor of relevancy. It has been held that “what is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity.” The allegedly defamatory statements made in the Petition to Deny Due Course certainly pass the test of relevancy considering that they are the very grounds relied upon to cause the denial or cancellation of the certificate of nomination.
Finally, as regards the non-publication test, We have laid down the rule that when a person tends to send a communication to an office/officer which/who has a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication. Under COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of nomination of party-list nominees may only be filed with the Office of the Clerk of the Commission and no other office. Further, a copy of the petition must be furnished to the respondent. Private complainant admitted that only he and the other parties in the Petition to Deny Due Course were given copies thereof. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the fact that Santos was also given a copy does not amount to publications because he is impleaded therein and Resolution No. 9366 requires that the petition be furnished to respondents.
The foregoing tests having been satisfied, We hold that petitioner’s statements in his Petition to Deny Due Course are covered by absolute privilege, thus, warranting his acquittal.” (Citations omitted)
GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 261627, November 13, 2024, Rosario, J.