Facts:
Efren, a security supervisor of an agency, figured in an altercation with Nestor, a tricycle driver, who blocked his path. In the ensuing altercation, Efren drew a Cal. 38 revolver issued to him by the security agency, and shot Nestor four times, though the gun did not discharge. Subsequently, Efren was arrested, and charged with violation of the election gun ban in effect at the time of his arrest. In his defense, he argued that at the time of the incident, his agency had a pending application for exemption from the election gun ban, which was subsequently issued in March, 2004.
The RTC and the CA both convicted him.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, he argues that the COMELEC has no power to fix the election period to the 90-30 rule provided by the Omnibus Election Code, and his arrest was beyond the election period set by law for the 2004 election
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to fix the election period other than those provided under the law.
Ruling:
- The COMELEC is expressly authorized to fix a different date of the election period.
“No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides..
Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this authority:
. . .
Evidently, the 120-day [1,e, the “90-30”] period is merely the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the Commission’s act of fixing the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The Commission did not prescribe the or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election laws.
As defined by Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only be committed during the election period. An element of these offenses (i.e.) that it be committed during the election period) is variable, as election periods are not affixed to a specific and permanent date. Nevertheless, the definition of the offense is already complete. By fixing the date of the election period, the Commission did not change what the offense is or how it is committed. There is thus no intrusion into the legislative sphere.
There is also no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the extended election period only applies to pre-election activities other than the determination of administrative or criminal liability for violating election laws. Neither the law nor the Constitution authorizes the use of two distinct election periods from the same election. The law does not distinguish between election offenses and other pre-election activities in terms of the applicable period. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should this Court.
The Court thus takes this opportunity to reiterate that the COMELEC has the power to extend the election period provided in the Constitution and the OEC, for the purpose of ensuring that elections are free, fair, and credible.”
Baguinon. Sr., v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 255983, January 27, 2025, Gaerlan, J.