Prior to the ruling in Ilon v. People[1], the prevailing rule is that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to reckless imprudence cases, thus, mitigating and/or aggravating and other modifying circumstances that affect criminal liability do not factor in the imposition of the penalty. Revisiting previous rulings, the Court in Ilon vs. People, on invocation by the accused that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor, the Court ruled:
“The foregoing discussion present the Court with two possible interpretations regarding the applicability of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code with regard to reckless imprudence committed under Article 365, paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The first view of interpretation, as held in the cases of Apigo, Agito, Medroso, and De los Santos, is that the modifying circumstances are not applicable to all acts committed under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code including acts committed under paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 thereof based on the proviso under paragraph 5 of the same Article (first view).
On the other hand, the second view of interpretation as held in Ibabao is that the modifying circumstances under Article 64 maybe applied over acts committed under paragraph 6, subparagraph 2, because the first five paragraphs of Article 365 do not apply to paragraph 6 thereof, based on the clause stating that “the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable.” (second view)
Confronted with these two interpretations, the Court finds an opportune moment to determine which between the first view and second view should be applied to guide the bench, the bar ,and the public in relation to acts falling writhing paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the Court deems it necessary to apply the rules of statutory construction to aid the Court in reconciling the two conflicting interpretations.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous,. The Court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language — for it is the Court’s duty to apply the law the way that it is worded. This rule of statutory construction is otherwise known as the verba legis rule or the “plain meaning rule,” which states that “if the statute is clear, plain[‘] and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.”
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds the second view to be more in keeping with the verba legis rule or the “plain meaning rule.” A cursory reading of the clause of Article 365, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code in stating that “the provisions contained in the article shall not be applicable:… 2. When, by impudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be cause…” Included in the preceding paragraphs before paragraph 6 is paragraph 5, which give courts the discretion to impose the penalties in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code “without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.” Thus, as discussed in Ibaban paragraph 6 should be considered as the exception to the applicability of the preceding provisions under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, including paragraph 5 of Article 365, which speaks of Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this relation, the Court finds that the second view is further supported by the history and development of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code together with the penalty prescribed for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide committed while using a motor vehicle.
Prior to the Revised Penal Code, Article 568 of the Penal Code, as cited in Apigo, punishes reckless imprudence or imprudencia temeraria as follows:
“He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prison correccional in its minimum degree, and with arresto menor in its medium and maximum degree.
“He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
“In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
“The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the court shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they consider proper.”
Article 568 of the Penal Code was amended by Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code as Article 365. Aside from the Revised Penal Code defining what constitutes as reckless imprudence and simple imprudence, Article 365 now made two situations where the provisions of the article would not apply: (a) Article 568, paragraph 4 of the Penal Code; and now (b) when there is imprudence and negligence and there is violation of the Automobile Law causing the person, to wit:
Article 365, Imprudence and negligence. — Any person, who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correctional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than Five thousand persons. ([PHP]P5,000).
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong, which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in article 62.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
- When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which them may deem proper to apply.
- When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstance regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give.
It can be observed that the two situations contemplated under Article 365, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those that follow the clause “the provisions contained in this article is not applicable,” remain unchanged. This is despite the fact of the succeeding amendments to provisions of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the Court notes that the penalty prescribed in relation to the act covered by Article 365, paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 had the occasion to be changed by the legislature considering the changes made in the Automobile Law.
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code, Act No 2159, passed on February 6, 1912, penalized the act of recklessly operating a motor vehicle which can endanger the “property or safety or rights of any person”:
SECTION 25. No person shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway in these Islands recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and propert, having regard to the width, traffic, grades, crossings, curvatures, and other conditions of the highway and to the conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety of any person or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.
No person shall unreasonably obstruct or impede the passage or right of travel of any motor vehicle or operator thereof and no operator shall unreasonably obstruct the passage of any other vehicle or person on any highway. Every person found guilty of violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not less that five nor more than fifty pesos or by imprisonment of not more than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment.
With the advent of the Revised Penal Code, Article 365 prescribed a different penalty when the death of a person is caused by negligence or imprudence in violation of the Automobile Law:
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — …
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
- When by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods.
Immediately after the effectivity of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, the Legislature passed Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law on December 3, 1932, which amended the penalty for the death of a person caused by negligence or imprudence with the use of a motor vehicle, to wit:
SEC. 76 Violations and Penalties. — The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act.
. . .
(d) If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the motor vehicle driver or operator at fault, shall, upon conviction be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen days nor more than six years in the discretion of the court.
Notably, Act No. 3992 explicitly provided for a distinct penalty for the crime, which is different from that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, i.e., “imprisonment for not less than fifteen days nor more than six months.”
Thereafter, on September 22, 1950, Act No. 3992 was amended by Republic Act No. 587. In particular, Republic Act No. 587 again amended the penalty for the commission of the said crime to wit:
Section 16. Section sixty-seven, article one, Chapter four, of Act Numbered Thirty-nine hundred and ninety-two, is hereby amended to read as follows:
“Sec. 67, Violations and penalties. — The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act.
. . . .
(d) If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury to any person, the motor vehicle driver at fault, shall, upon conviction, be punished under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
As may be gleaned above, the prescribed penalty for the crime was reverted to what is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code, i.e. prision correcional in its medium and maximum periods.
Significantly, the reversion of the prescribed penalty to what is provided under the Revised Penal Code would be retained by the present Automobile Law, Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. In particular, Section 56 of Republic Act No. 4136 states that the prescribed penalty for the death of a person caused by negligence or imprudence with the use of motor vehicle shall be based on the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
SECTION 56. Penalty for Violation. — The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act:
. . . .
(n) If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonable fast driving, any accident occurs resulting in death or injury of any person, the motor vehicle operator at fault, shall, upon conviction, be punished under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The same language in Section 56 9n) of Republic Act No. 4136 would be retained in Batas Pambansa Blg. 398, passed on May 18, 1983, which further amended the provisions of Republic Act No. 4`36.
As illustrated above, the evolution of Article 365 supports the second view when taken together with decisions involving the appreciation of modifying circumstances in relation to reckless imprudence. In particular, the Court observes that the application of the rulings in Apigo and Quijano in Agito was improper, considering that:
- The factual circumstance of Apigo and Quijano, which served as Agito’s rationale, were different for Agito and did not involve the commission of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with the use of a motor vehicle; and
- Significantly, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (previously Article 568 of the Penal Code) had yet to contemplate paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 of Article 365 during the the time when Apigo was decided by the Court.
Moreover, the Court’s ruling in Ibabao likewise acknowledges that the impossible penalty may be increased through a special aggravating circumstance (i.e. the failure to lend aid to the injured party). To the Court’s mind, to adopt the first view would be to create an inequitable situation where the range of the impossible penalty may be increased with an aggravating circumstance, but cannot be decreased through a mitigating circumstance.
In the vein, the development oof the penalty prescribed for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide through the use of a motor vehicle likewise supports the second view. Following the Court’s discussion above, it is divined that the legislature intended to keep the original language of Article 365, paragraph 6, subparagraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code based on the amendments Mande for Act No. 3992 up until Batas Pambansa Blg. 398. Moreover, the language of the amendments likewise did not revise or amend the “The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable” […] found in Article 365, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Taking the foregoing considerations all together, the Court thus reconsiders the doctrine espoused by Agito and similar cases and now holds that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for the rules on the application of modifying circumstances, are applicable to the commission of acts covered by Article 365, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically those falling within subparagraph 2.
At this juncture, it is important to clarify that the exception made in Article 365, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code only relates to the paragraphs preceding the same (i.e. paragraphs 1 to 5 of the same Article). Thus, the succeeding paragraphs of Article 365 — including the last paragraph which prescribes higher penalties to an “offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injuries parties such help as may be in his hands to give”— are still applicable to all crimes falling under this Article where there is an injured party involved, regardless of whether they fall under paragraphs 1 to 5 of to paragraph 6 of Article 365.XX” (Citations omitted)
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[1] G.R. No. 260538, November 11, 2025