In January 2005, during a flag ceremony, petitioner asked the employees of the OSP what to do with the monetary contributions solicited in their December 2004 Christmas party charity drive. They agreed that their donations be given in kind to the typhoon victims of Quezon, for the purchase of water pumps. One of those who donated was Elvira Chua, who gave P26, 660. In the succeeding flag ceremonies, Villa-Ignacio told the employees that the contractor declined the project, thus he proposed that the donation be given to the Gawad Kalinga Community Foundation. He also claimed that the employees participated in the discussions and agreed to the donation. He then instructed his subordinate, Elvira Bernabe, to apply for a manager’s check payable to Gawad Kalinga, and the donation was posted in the bulletin board of the OSP. Chua contested the donation, insisting that Villa-Ignacio and Bernabe committed Estafa when they donated the money intended for the typhoon victims of Quezon to Gawad Kalinga, and filed administrative and criminal charges against Villa-Ignacio and Bernabe before the Internal Affairs Bureau, then chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro.
Villa-Ignacio consistently the proceedings before the IAB; according to him, the investigation violates IAB’s rules because Casimiro and Chua belong to the same office, the Office of the Ombusdman’s Central Office; the charges against him were pure vendetta, he added, and the employees agreed to the donation.
After investigation, the IAB absolved Bernabe, but recommended the filing of an Information for Estafa against Villa-Ignacio, which then Ombusdman Conchita Carpio approved for filing before the Sandiganbayan.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner claims that respondents gravely abused their discretion by violating their own rules of procedure when they charged him with estafa.
The Ruling:
We grant the petition. Respondents committed grave abuse of discretion when they failed to observe their own rules in the conduct of their proceedings against petitioner.
Violation of Administrative Order No. 16
Administrative Order No. (A.O.) 16, Series of 2003, entitled “Creation of an Internal Affairs Board,” outlines the procedure for handling complaints against officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman. In arguing for the disqualification of Casimiro, petitioner invokes Section III(N) of A.O. 16, which reads:
N. Disqualifications
The Chairman, Vice Chairman or any member of the IAB, as well as any member of the IAB Investigating Staff, shall be automatically disqualified from acting on a complaint or participating in a proceeding under the following circumstances:
1. He is a party to the complaint, either as a respondent or complainant;
2. He belongs to the same component unit as any of the parties to the case;
3. He belongs or belonged to the same component unit as any of the parties to the case during the period when the act complained of transpired;
4. He is pecuniarily interested in the case or is related to any of the parties within the sixth degree of affinity or consanguinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the provisions of civil law; or
5. He has, at one time or another, acted upon the matter subject of the complaint or proceeding. x x x (Emphases supplied)
In this case, there is no dispute that Chua reports to the Central Office, which is the same as the unit of Casimiro. Straightforwardly, the latter should have been disqualified from acting on her complaint against petitioner.
Despite the protest of petitioner at the very onset of the case, Casimiro continued to handle the proceedings against the former. Casimiro signed several Orders requiring the submission of counter-affidavits, supporting evidence, position papers, and rejoinders; and eventually issued the assailed resolutions. The IAB did not rule on the objection of petitioner until it had already concluded the proceedings against him.
The IAB ventured to justify the inclusion of Casimiro only when it issued its assailed Resolution dated 4 February 2010. It ruled that A.O. 16 did not apply, since the questioned charity drive transpired prior to the assignment of Chua to the Central Office in 2006.
The appreciation of the IAB is utterly incorrect. As can be read in paragraphs 2 and 3, Section III(N) of A.O. 16 patently disqualifies a person who belongs to the same component unit as any of the parties to the case, regardless of the timeframe that the acts complained of transpired. Clearly, the operative ground for disqualification arises when a member of the investigating and adjudicatory body is connected to the same unit as that of any of the parties to the case.
Now, before this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman points out that during the pendency of the proceedings before the IAB, A.O. 21 entitled “Revised Rules of the Internal Affairs Board” amended A.O. 16. A.O. 21 deleted paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III(N), thereby removing the disqualification of IAB members belonging to the same component unit as any of the parties to the cases before them.
This amendment acquired a questionable character, as it was sought to be implemented subsequent to the breach by the IAB of its own rules.In our view, the supervening revision of A.O. 16 contravenes the avowed policy of the Office of the Ombudsman to “adopt and promulgate stringent rules that shall ensure fairness, impartiality, propriety and integrity in all its actions.”
Changing regulations in the middle of the proceedings without reason, after the violation has accrued, does not comply with fundamental fairness, or in other words, due process of law. In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, this Court characterized due process of law in this manner:
It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reasons and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.
Violation of Administrative Order No. 7
According to Section 4, Rule II of A.O. 7 entitled “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,” supporting witnesses must execute affidavits to substantiate a complaint against a person under preliminary investigation. Affidavits are voluntary declarations of fact written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.
Here, the IAB concluded that a “majority of the OSP officers and employees disclaimed that they had knowledge of and consented to the turning-over of their donations to Gawad Kalinga Foundation.” As its basis, public respondent relied upon the Manifestation dated 4 September 2008 signed by 28 officials and employees of the OSP.
That Manifestation, which purports to be the voice of the majority belying the donation to Gawad Kalinga, does not qualify as an affidavit as it was not sworn to by the declarants before an officer authorized to administer oaths. Therefore, based on A.O. 7, public respondents should not have considered an unverified and unidentified private document as evidence in its proceeding against petitioner.
CONCLUSION
There is no dispute that public respondents blatantly violated their own regulations by continuously disregarding the disqualification of Casimiro and utilizing a disallowed document as basis for the assailed ruling. Worse, the board did not remedy its breaches or give any reason to justify its transgressions.
In Agbayani v. COMELEC, wherein the tribunal violated its own procedure, this Court held:
The petitioner has correctly pointed out that the Order of the First Division of the COMELEC dismissing the pre-proclamation controversy and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying the motion for reconsideration were both penned by Commissioner Abueg, in violation of its rule that —
… No member shall be the ‘ponente’ of an en banc decision, resolution or a motion to reconsider a decision/resolution written by him in a Division.
This is still another, reason why the challenged acts must be reversed. The Commission on Elections should be the first to respect and obey its own rules, if only to provide the proper example to those appearing before it and to avoid all suspicion of bias or arbitrariness in its proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, by doing the exact opposite of what the rules command, public respondents have demonstrated their patent and persistent disregard of the law. Certiorari, therefore, lies. In no uncertain terms, we pronounced in Jardin v. National Labor Relations Commission as follows:
The phrase “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” has settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power as to amount to lack of power. In labor cases, this Court has declared in several instances that disregarding rules it is bound to observe constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of labor tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,the dismissed public school teachers were tried by an improperly constituted tribunal. The Court ruled therein that the “committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.” Given that petitioner herein faced a similar predicament, we likewise rule that the proceedings against him before the IAB, as approved by the Ombudsman, are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 4 February 2010 and Joint Order dated 4 June 2010 of the Office of the Ombudsman’s Internal Affairs Board approved by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-08-0132-D, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Information for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Number SB-10-CRM-0110, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SERENO, C.J.:
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J., on official leave.
G. R. No. 193092, February 21, 2017, DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO, PETITIONER, V. OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS BOARD OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, ELVIRA C. CHUA, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.
Citations omitted.
1 thought on “Changing regulations in the middle of the proceedings without reason, after the violation has accrued, does not comply with fundamental fairness, or in other words, due process of law.”