The RTC and the Court of Appeals, in declaring the marriage between Juanita and James Paul void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code, ruled that James’s Dependent Personality Disorder, as stated in the report and testimony of clinical psychologist Ms. Shiela Marie O. Montefalcon rendered him incapable of performing his essential obligations on marriage, characterised by a) difficulty in making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to substance use and abuse.
Juanita appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of the parties should be annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it bears stressing that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the root cause or juridical antecedence of petitioner’s alleged NPD. Finding no cogent reason to disturb the same, the resolution of this case shall, thus, revolve on whether or not, on the other hand, respondent’s psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD, was proven.
Jurisprudence states that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws; hence, any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended,psychological incapacity is a valid ground to nullify a marriage. However, in deference to the State’s policy on marriage, psychological incapacity does not merely pertain to any psychological condition; otherwise, it would be fairly easy to circumvent our laws on marriage so much so that we would be practically condoning a legal subterfuge for divorce.
According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support.
In this accord, psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that – contrary to the rulings of the courts a quo – the totality of evidence presented failed to sufficiently establish respondent’s psychological incapacity based on his DPD.
In this case, respondent relied heavily on the testimony of and psychological examination by the clinical psychologist, Ms. Montefalcon, to establish his psychological incapacity. In her report, she enumerated several clinical features indicative of respondent’s DPD, to wit: (a) difficulty in making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; (b) problem in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to substance use and abuse. However, the report leaves much to be desired as it did not even identify specific actions or incidents that could amply demonstrate his alleged psychological incapacity. As the petitioner aptly points out, “[i]n the [p]sychological [r]eport, there is nothing in [respondent’s] acts that is indicative of his ‘chronic condition in which he depends too much on others to meet his emotional and physical needs.’ In fact, the report failed to show ‘who’ are those other that [respondent] depended [on] too much x x x.”Also, as petitioner emphasizes, respondent’s alleged DPD appears to be even contrary to his personality since the report actually states, among others, that respondent’s “common capacities and strengths” are “being friendly, energetic, resourceful, and having negotiating skills.”Moreover, the report states that respondent “is best in situations that need sound common sense and practical ability with things [as] he relies on his ability to improvise instead of preparing in advance.”
More importantly, the link between respondent’s acts to his alleged psychological incapacity was not established. Even if it is assumed that respondent truly had difficulties in making everyday decisions without excessive advice or reassurance coming from other people, such as petitioner and his own mother, the report fails to prove that the said difficulties were tantamount to serious psychological disorder that would render him incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. As case law holds, “[i]n determining the existence of psychological incapacity, a clear and understandable causation between the party’s condition and the party’s inability to perform the essential marital covenants must be shown. A psychological report that is essentially comprised of mere platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon, would not cut the marriage tie.”
Similarly, Ms. Montefalcon’s report merely provided general characterizations of the parties’ illnesses as deeply-rooted, grave, and incurable. In her report, she stated that the root cause of the parties’ flawed personality patterns was attributable to genetic factors and/or dysfunctional factors involved in their childhood milieu. She also declared that their illnesses were grave, since the parties were not able to carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family, and incurable, as they have no psychological insight that they have character problems. However, no evidence was presented to substantiate these conclusions. In fact, as petitioner demonstrates, the report seems to contradict the foregoing characterizations since it was observed that respondent “was awaken and decided x x x to fix his life” and that “[h]e admitted that he is weak but he was able to resist drugs and [is now] helping his mother run their business.” As such, it cannot be concluded that respondent’s DPD is imbued with the required quality of permanence or incurability.
If anything, Ms. Montefalcon’s evaluation only supports the allegations regarding respondent’s infidelity, immaturity, and dependence on his mother and wife, which traits do not, however, rise to the level of the psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. Indeed, while respondent’s purported womanizing caused the couple’s frequent fights, such was not established to be caused by a psychological illness. In fact, records reveal that when petitioner discovered respondent’s affair for the first time, the latter immediately severed it. They would also eventually reconcile and live together after their fights. Thus, respondent’s infidelity does not appear to be a symptom of a grave and permanent psychological disorder that renders him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
In fine, for failing to sufficiently prove the existence of respondent’s psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code, the petition is granted. The contrary rulings of the courts a quo are hence, reversed and set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 6, 2018 and the Resolution dated August 1, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 109683 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 241144, June 26, 2019, JUANITA E. CAHAPISAN-SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, V. JAMES PAUL A. SANTIAGO, RESPONDENT.
Citations omitted.
SEE ALSO:
1 thought on “Psychological Incapacity: A psychological report that is essentially comprised of mere platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon, would not cut the marriage tie.””