RA 10175 did not create a new crime but merely implements the RPC’s provisions on libel when written defamatory remarks are published through a computer system. – “XX. Section 4(c ) (4) of RA 10175 merely implements the RPC’s provisions on Libel under Articles 353 and 355 thereof when it is committed through a computer system. Thus, in determining the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, the RPC, not Act No. 3326, should be applied.
First, a textual analysis of Section 4 ( c )(4) of RA 10175 readily reveals that the special law did not create any new crime. Instead, it merely enforces Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC on Libel when committed “through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.” Verily, in defining the act to be punished, RA 10175 itself refers to Article 355 of the RPC, viz.:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
X x x x x
© Content-related Offenses:
X X X X
(4) Libel. – The unlawful or prohibited acts as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future. (Italics supplied)
Second, the Court could not have been more categorical in its Disini Decision: Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section 4 ( c ) (4) of Ra 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and the same crime with the same elements. RA 10175 simply recognizes a computer system as “similar means” of publication and makes the use of information and communications technology (ICT) in the commission of the Libel as a qualifying circumstance:
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4 9 c ) (4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.
X x x x
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the Internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.
X x x x
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4 ( c) (4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4 (c ) (4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4 © (4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription under double jeopardy.
In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the Disini Decision, the Court reiterated that Cyber Libel is not a new crime for it is essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace.
Finally, even the lawmakers recognized that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of cyber or online Libel because it is already defined by the RPC. In passing Section 4 ( c ) (4) of Ra 10175, they acknowledged that the RPC is a very old law dating back to the Spanish occupation, where the legislators could not have contemplated the use of technologies not yet existing at that time, such as a computer system, to publish libelous statements. With RA 10175, the law recognizes computer systems and ICT as novel means of committing libel. Thus, by including a specific RPC provision in RA 10175, the legislators intended to implement existing laws on Libel when the defamatory remarks are made online, which are “just online versions of actual criminal activites in the real world.”
The foregoing irrefragrably shows that RA 10175 did not create a new crime of Cyber Libel but merely enforces the felony of Libel as already defined and penalized by Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, when it is committed with the use of a computer system as a means of publishing libelous statements and increases the penalty for Libel by one degree higher than that prescribed by the RPC when the crime is committed with the use of ICT. Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by the RPC.
CAUSING v. People of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 258524, October 11, 2023