Purpose of fine as penalty. – “The fine provided for in BP 22 was intended as an additional penalty for the act of issuing a worthless check. This is the only logical conclusion sicne the law does not require that there be damage or prejudice to the individual complainant by reason of the issuance of the worthless check”[1]
Rationale on why fine shouled be imposed for first time offenders. – “B.P. Blg. 22, §1, par. 1 provides a penalty of “imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the Court.” Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.”[2]
Subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine imposed applicable in B.P 22.– “The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
“ART. 38. Pecuniary liabilities – Order of payment – in case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
- The reparation of the damage caused;
- Indemnification of consequential damages;
- The fine.
- The costs of the proceedings. (Underscoring ours)
“ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
- If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in case shall it continue for more than one year; and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.” (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which provides:
- “ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.” (Underscoring ours
X X X
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its
imposition in cases involving its violations.”[3]
Probation not proper where accused was convicted of 54 counts of BP 22, and evaded her civil liability. – “For the foregoing, it can be gleaned that petitioner has shown no remorse for the criminal acts she committed against the private respondent. Her issuing subject fifty four (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To allow petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the seriousness of her malefactions. Worse, instead of complying with the orders of the trial court requiring her to pay her civil liability, she even resorted to devious schemes to evade the execution of the judgment against her. Verily, petitioner is not the penitent offender who is eligible for probation within legal contemplation. Her demeanor manifested that she is incapable to be reformed and will only be a menace to society should she be permitted to co-mingle with the public.”[4]
Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of BP 22. The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in BP 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint [5]of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
X x. x x
3. Should only fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.
X x x”[6]
A.C. 12-2000 is not a penal law; it merely lays down a rule of preference in the imposition of penalty in BP 22; it has no retroactive application. – “Petitioner’s reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit has not basis.
“First. SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The Circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
“Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused – whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence – and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.”[7]
SC Admin Circular 12-2000 does not confer any new right in favor of the accused. – “Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to impsing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.”[8]
Retroactive application of SC 12-2000 will not lie the basis of satisfaction of civil liability. – Where the civil liability of the accused was satisfied thru levy and sale of his properties only after the criminal case had been terminated with conviction, accused cannot invoke retroactive application of SC Admin Circular No. 12-2000 on the basis of satisfaction of his civil liability. “Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty.”[9]
Subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine imposed applicable in B.P 22. – “The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and 39 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
“ART. 38. Pecuniary liabilities – Order of payment – in case the property of the offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities, the same shall be met in the following order:
- The reparation of the damage caused;
- Indemnification of consequential damages;
- The fine.
- The costs of the proceedings. (Underscoring ours)
“ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
- If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in case shall it continue for more than one year; and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.” (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which provides:
- “ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.” (Underscoring ours
X X X
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its violations.”[10]
Where the fine imposed by the trial court is excessive and erroneous, obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and judgment had become final and executory, the Court may revisit the judgment and correct the erroneous penalty imposed, in the interest of substantial justice[11]
Where no proof or allegation was adduced that accused was not a first time offender, it would best serve the interests of justice if petitioner is just fined to enable her to continue her medical practice so as not to deprive her of income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the fine.[12]The interests of justice would best be served if petitioner would simply be fined, double the amount of the subject check, instead of imprisoned, to enable him to find ways to settle his civil obligations to private complainant, not to mention the fine imposed on him.[13]
Honest efforts to fulfill financial obligations merit coupled with the fact that accused had not been previously charged or convicted of BP 22, merit the imposition of fine instead of imprisonment on the accused.[14]Absent any showing that petitioners acted in bad faith, the deletion of penalty of imprisonment in this case is proper.[15]
Where imprisonment instead of fine was imposed. – The fact that accused is not a first time offender, and his issuance of fifty and the sixty-four (64) bouncing checks is a serious offense. “To impose only fine would be to depreciate the seriousness of his malefactions. The importance of arresting the proliferation of bouncing checks can not be overemphasized.”[16]
“When petitioner issued the subject postdated checks even though he had no more account with the drawee bank, having closed it more than four years before the he drew and delivered the checks, he manifested utter lack of good faith or wanton bad faith. Hence, he cannot avail himself of the benefits under Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.”[17]
Penalty was out of range of BP 22. – In Higa v. People, [18]accused, convicted of 51 counts of BP 22, appealed the penalty imposed on her by the lower courts as being excessive and too harsh. She was sentenced to 51 years, 1 year prision correccional for each count of BP 22. The Court agreed with her, ruling that the penalty imposed was out of range as that provided by BP 22, and in view of the enactment of AC No. 12-2000. “Indeed, the imposition by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of imprisonment of one year of prision correccional for each count of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 resulting in a total of 51 years is too harsh taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner is not a recidivist, and that past · transactions show that the petitioner had made good in her payment. It , cannot be gainsaid that what is involved here is the life and liberty of the petitioner. If her penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would not be conformable with law and she would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 51 years, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law; thus, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner should be duly corrected”
[1] Lazaro v. CA and People, G.R. No. 105461, November 11, 1993
[2] Vaca v. Ca, G.R. No. 131714, November 16, 1998
[3] Jao Yu v. People, G.R. No. 134172, September 30, 2004,
[4] Santos v. CA and Castro, G.R No. 127899, December 2, 1999
[6] Jao Yu v. People, G.R. No. 134172, September 30, 2004, cited in Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
[7] De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City, 417 SCRA 636, cited in Go and People v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005
[8] Go and People v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005
[9] Go and People v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876, June 21, 2005
[10] Jao Yu v. People, G.R. No. 134172, September 30, 2004; Diongzon v. CA, G.R. No. 114823, December 23, 1999; Llamado v. CA, 337 Phil 153 (1997)
[11] Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
[12]Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 133036, January 22, 2003
[13] Young v. CA, G.R. No. 140425, March 10, 2005
[14] Lagman v. People, G,R. No. 146238, December 7, 2001
[15] Aguirre v. People, G.R. No. 144142, August 23, 2001, cited in Tan v. Mendez, G.R. No. 138669, June 6, 2002
[16]Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, October 26, 2001
[17] Nagrampa v. People, G.R. no. 146211, August 6, 2002
[18] G.R No. 185473, August 17, 2016