Facts:
Ponce De Leon was convicted by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended by RA 8294 and RA 10691. This after the PNP applied for a search warrant on his house after it found out that two of his registered firearms licenses expired.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed his conviction. On motion for reconsideration, Ponce for the first time invoked that on August 20, 2014, then Chief, PNP qpproved the extension of validity of firearms registration fortwo years for licenses due to expitre in 2014, or up to December 31, 2015. Thus, his firearms licens was still valid at the time of the implementation of the search warrant. As proof thereof, he attached screenshots of posts and articles from reposts of the news of the extension.
The CA denied his motion for reconsideration. It ruled that issues raised for the first time on appeal or motion for reconsideration are not allowed; it also stated that screenshots are deemed as hearsay evidence unless authenticated under the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA should have taken judicial notice of the PNP resolution extending the validity of the firearms license registration, and thus acquit Ponce De Leon of the crime charged.
Ruling:
Applying the rule on judicial notice, the Court ruled that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the fact that the PNP extended the validity of firearms licenses, and since the validity of Ponce De Leon’s firearms fell within the extension period, the prosecution did not meet one of the requirements of the crime, that is; that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it:
“Granted, it is settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal or on motion for reconsideration will not be entertained. However, it is known that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review. Regardless of the fact that an issue is raised only upon appeal, our courts are bound to rule in favor of the accused if it gives rise to doubt as to their guilt.
In this case, the issue raised by petitioner ultimately affects the determination of his innocence. Thus, the Court finds it proper to entertain the points raised by petitioner, for a just resolution of the case.
On the issue regarding petitioner’s failure to attach a copy of the issuance or memorandum from the PNP, indeed, he merely attached copies of news articles and posts reporting the extension. However, there may be merit in petitioner’s contention that the Court can take judicial notice of this matter.
Judicial notice is defined as the cognizance of certain facts which courts may take and act on without proof, because they already know them. Otherwise stated, by taking judicial notice, the court dispenses with the need for the traditional form of presentation of evidence.
The Court took the opportunity to discuss this in State Prosecutors v. Muro, viz.:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and [they are] not authorized to make [their] individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of [their] action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.
Under Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary, to wit:
RULE 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (Emphasis in the original)
Verily, there have been several instances where the Court took judicial notice of facts deemed relevant for its proper resolution of the case.
In In Re: Petition for Adoption of Jan Aurel Maghanoy Bulayo, the Court took judicial notice of the existence of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Japan. It explained that diplomatic relations form part of the official acts of the executive department, and are matters which are of public knowledge. Hence, the Court concluded that this no longer requires the presentation of proof
Also, in Suplico v. NEDA, the Court dealt with the ZTE National Broadband Network Project, which petitioners therein sought to enjoin. However, in a meeting with China, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo informed China’s President Hu Jintao that the Philippines had decided not to continue with the project. On this basis, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion with the Court, insisting that the issues of the case have become moot. To counter this, petitioners asserted, among others, that the OSG failed to attach the notes of the said meeting with China to prove its allegations.
In agreeing with the OSG, the Court stated that pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules on Evidence, it has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President, who heads the executive branch. Since the act of the cancellation of the proposed project is an official act of the executive department, the Court explained that it must take judicial notice of the same without the need for evidence.
Lastly, in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
the Court was called to determine whether the President committed grave abuse of discretion in calling the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the President’s exercise of judgment and discretion deserves to be accorded respect. In its examination, the Court took judicial notice of bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places at that time.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that pursuant to Republic Act No. 6975, it is the PNP that has the authority to issue licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives. Republic Act No. 10591 expressly states that it is the Chief of the PNP, through the FEO, who shall issue licenses to qualified individuals and cause the registration of firearms. The PNP is likewise in charge of implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591.
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 10591 introduced significant changes in the application and procedure for firearms licenses. Thus, upon the promulgation of the IRR of Republic Act No. 10591 on December 7, 2013, individuals and organizations filed petitions to question the validity of the law and the rules, consolidated in Acosta v. Ochoa.
Pending the resolution of the petitions, on April 8, 2014, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the PNP from fully implementing Republic Act No. 10591 and its IRR, particularly the provisions on: (1) the centralization of firearms applications and renewals at the PNP Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City; (2) the implementation and enforcement of the “waiver and consent” requirement for the licensing and registration of firearms, whereby applicants were required to sign a Consent for Voluntary Presentation for Inspection, authorizing the PNP to inspect their firearms at the residence/address indicated in the application; and (3) the utilization of courier services for delivery of firearms license cards.
Subsequently, the PNP announced the extension of the validity of firearms licenses expiring in 2014, to December 31, 2015. The PNP explained that this is to give way to upgrades in the information technology involved in the firearms registration system.Also, given the Court’s issuance of the TRO, the extension was called for due to the necessary replication of the registration system to the regional offices of the PNP, as this was originally only available at its Headquarters in Camp Crame. Notably, the said extension was publicly reported in different news outlets at the time.
Verily, on October 15, 2019, the Court promulgated its decision on Acosta, declaring the provision in the IRR on the “waiver and consent” requirement for the licensing and registration of firearms as unconstitutional. Hence, the Court made its TRO on this matter permanent.
To repeat, a court is mandated to take judicial notice of, without the introduction of evidence, the official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines. Concomitantly, in light of the PNP’s authority to issue licenses for the possession of firearms, the TRO issued during the pendency of Acosta, and the publicity of the extension granted by the PNP, it is clear that the extension is an official act of the government which the Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of.
Again, the firearms license of petitioner relevant in this case expired on July 18, 2014, and his house was searched on October 11, 2015. Both of these dates fall under the extension announced by the PNP, which again, extended the validity of firearms licenses due for expiration in 2014, to December 31, 2015. Therefore, it is evident that the second element of illegal possession of firearms is absent. Petitioner benefited from the extension and his firearms license was still valid at the time his house was searched.
It is established that in criminal cases, the paramount consideration is not whether there is doubt in the innocence of the accused, but whether there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt. If the accused’s guilt is questionable, the Court must rule in their favor, as every fact relevant to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court will fall short of its duties if it fails to apply these well-entrenched principles in petitioner’s case.
Hence, due to the prosecution’s failure to establish all the elements of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, petitioner must perforce be acquitted.” (Citations omitted)
PONCE DE LEON y LAMUAS vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 256591, December 3, 2025