Nature of an ejectment case. – “An ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceedings designed to provide expeditions means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession (possession de fecato) of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averments of ownership by the defendant outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question oof ownership is raised in the pleadings, like her, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determiner the question of possession especially if the question is inseparably linked with the question of possession. The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property.”[1] (Citations omitted)
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer. – “Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
Accordingly, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the proeprty in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff nee not have prior physical possession of the proeprty, or else wise stated, prior physical possession is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case.”[2] (Citations omitted.)
Frocible entry. – “For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners por legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.”[3]
Issue to be resolved. – “The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is who— is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, tto the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful witholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession..
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better rights lawfully ejects him. To repeat,t the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical possession.”[4]
One-year period. – In a forcible entry case, the one-year prescriptive period is generally reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land. However, if forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the entry. In marked contrast, the ne-year period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate”[5] (citations omitted)
Required possession. – “In forcible entry cases, possession means nothing more than physical, actual or material possession or possession de fact, and not the one coming out of or arising from ownership or possession de jure. The issue is only prior physical possession, and not title.”[6] (Citations omitted)
“Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.”[7] (Citations omitted)
“We have held in various forcible entry cases similar to the case at bar that for one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times. Possession can be acquired not only material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts, which are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments and the inscription of possession information titles.”[8]
Jurisdictional facts in a complaint for unlawful detainer:. “A complaint for unlawful detainer must sufficiently allege and prove the following key jurisdictional facts, to wit: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remains in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vantage the property, plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.”[9]
Tolerance, nature of.: “A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view that heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine, And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of the number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in —- and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary inn nature, and that the one-year time bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action”[10]. (Emphases supplied.)
Tolerance must be alleged and proved. – “It is dangerous to deprive a defendant of posssession over the land by means of a summary proceeding just because the plaintiff used the word “tolerance” without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.
Jurisdictional averments required for a registered owner in unlawful detainer cases. – “Upon these disquisitions, as in any ejectment proceeeings, a registered owner must sill prove the following jurisdictional averments:
- That initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
- That eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
- That thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
- That within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.”[11]
[1] Quijano v. Asante, G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2017
[2] Sumulong vs. CA and Inlanfd Trailways, Inc. G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994
[3] Mangaser v. Uguy, 749 Phil. 372, cited in Barcelo, et al. V. Riparip, et al. G.R. No. 250159, April 26, 2021
[4] Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 474 Phil. 557 (2004), cited in David v. Butay, G.R. No. 220996, April 26, 2022
[5] Barcelo, et al. V. Riparip, et al. G.R. No. 250159, April 26, 2021
[6] David v. Buta, G.R. No. 220996, April 26, 2022
[7] Manager v. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, cited in Palajos v. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 7, 2022
[8] Bunyi v. Factor, 609 Phil. 134 (2009), cited in Ruiz v. Armada, G.R. No. 232849, June 14, 2021
[9] Galacgac v. Bautista, G.R. No. 221384, November 9, 2020, citing Zacarias v. Anacay,
[10] Sarona v. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968) cited in Galacgac v. Bautista, G.R. No. 221384, November 9, 2020
[11] De Mesa v. Pulutan and Bundalian, G.R. No. 255397, September 12, 2022, citing Corpuz v. Agustin, 679 Phil. 352 (2012), and Iglesia De Cristo Jesucrtisto Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines vs. Dela Cruz.830 Phil. 547 (2018)