In Israel v. People[1], the appellant contended that non-verbal gestures alone cannot be considered Grave Threats, citing a number of cases. In this case, the lower courts convicted the accused of the crime of Grave Threats dues to his alleged threatening gesture as if “holding a gun and pulling the trigger and drawing a line across his neck with a hand.” In his view, only verbal gestures may be considered in Grave Threats. The Supreme Court debunked this argument, thus:
“The Court does not agree.
First, Article 282 does not distinguish between threats performed through verbal and non-verbal gestures, and neither should the Court. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Article 282 punishes “[a]ny person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, horn or or property of the latter or of his [or her] family of any wrong amounting to a crime.” The second paragraph also qualifies the threat if the same was made in writing, to wit: “If the threat be made in writing or through a middleman…” At its core, therefore, what Article 282 punishes is the communication of a threat made with the intention of intimidating its recipient. Evidently, there is nothing in Article 282 that distinguishes between verbal and non-verbal threats. While the second paragraph qualifies the mode of performing verbal threats (i.e., those made in writing and those made orally), it is no argument for the exclusion of non-verbal gestures as ”threats.”
Second, while the cases cited by Israel all pertain to an oral threat allegedly performed by the accused, this cannot be the premise to exclude non-verbal gestures from the scope of Article 282. Threats may be verbal or non-verbal, whereas, verbal threats may be performed orally or in writing. An oral threat, is therefore, a species under the genus of verbal threats as discussed above, which occupy a category distinct from non-verbal threats. For example, in Mission, which was also quoted by Israel, the Court declared in relevant part:
We believe that when the defendant grasped the handle of his pistol, his purpose was to dissuade the furious and nervous Julian from attacking with the scythe, a deadly weapon, but not to shoot him nor even to threaten him wantonly, only to protect himself. He therefore, acted in perfect self-defense.
The non-verbal gesture under consideration by the Court in Mission was the accused’s “grasp[ing] of the handle of his pistol.” If non-verbal gestures were indeed excluded from the concept of ‘threats,” the Court would have immediately acquitted the accused. However, the Court’s analysis impliedly that non-verbal gestures could qualify as “threats,” but because mens rea isnecessary for conviction, the Court needed first to ascertain the accused’s intentions. Hence, the Court acquitted the accused not because non-verbal gestures could not be considered threats, but because the accused’s intent was not criminal in character. This reasoning is consistent with other provisions in the Revised Penal Code. Article 285 [1] for examples provides that the non-verbal gesture of ‘draw[ing] a weapon in a quarrel’ is considered a threat.
Third, Israel’s reliance on the 1870 Spanish Penal Code is misplaced. Article 494 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code, like Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, does not make any distinction between verbal and non-verbal gestures when it punishes any persons “who shall threaten another.” Thus, Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, like Article 494 of the Spanish Penal Code, embraces the entire range of human interactions whereby a threat is communicated and only qualifies written threats and those made through a middleman with the maximum penalty.”
Note: Accused was still acquitted of the crime because the Court ruled that the element of “persistence” was not present in the case.
[1] Israel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 265736, November 19, 2025