Republic Act 11594 increased the penalty for perjury penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code to prision mayor in its minimum period., thus:
Section 1. Article 183 of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as “The Revised Penal Code”, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Article 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. – The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein: Provided, That is the person responsible for the commission of this felony is a public officer or employee, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period: Provided, finally, That the offender shall also suffer a fine not to exceed One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any appointive or elective position in the government or in any agency, entity, or instrumentality thereof.
Section 2. Article 184 of the same act, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Article 184. Offering false testimony in evidence. – Any person who shall willfully and knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by an authority of law on a material matter. Thus, a mere assertion of a false objective fact or a falsehood is not enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.[1]
Elements of perjury. –
- That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter;
- That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oaths;
- That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and
- That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.[2]
Material matter. – “The term “material matter” under the first element pertains to the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which ;legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified.”[3]
Willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood. – There can be no willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood where the respondents relied naively in the erroneous statements on the GIS prepared by the corporate accountant who was in a hurry to beat the deadline of the SEC; and who admitted his oversight[4]
Willfully means intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to “knowingly.” “Deliberately” implies “meditated” as distinguished from “inadvertent Acts.”. It must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or is consciously ignorant of its truth.[5]
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth.[6]
To be liable for perjury in a statement or affidavit in a verification and certification against forum shopping, the existence of perjury should be determined vis-a-vis the elements of forum shopping.[7]
When the accused willfully and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his “residence” and “moral character” in his petition for naturalization, he is liable for perjury. The allegations in the petition regarding “residence” and “moral character” are material maters because they are among the very facts in issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry, and are the bases for the determination of petitioner’s qualifications and fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen. While fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his verified petition for naturalization that “he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under C.A. No. 473, a clear assertion of falsehood under oath on material matters required by law.[8]
The withdrawal of the petition for naturalization does not preclude a prosecution for perjury, since at the time he filed his petition for naturalization, he had committed perjury as all the elements of the crime were already present then. The withdrawal of the petition only terminated the proceedings for naturalization, it did not extinguish his culpability for perjury already committed.[9]
Participation of the private prosecutor in a prosecution for perjury.- In Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee, v. Chua Pue Chin Le[10]e, the petitioner argues that the participation of the private prosecutor in the prosecution for perjury against him should not be allowed, as perjury is a crime against public interest and there is no offended party, thus there is no civil liability on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be compensated and there is no private person offended by the crime. The Court disagreed. Citing that the statement of the petitioner regarding his custody of title which he alleged to be lost thru inadvertence is without doubt injurious to the respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as his performance as board member and treasurer of the corporation, there is basis for the respondent to assert his right as private prosecutor in the case. In fact, the Court added, in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco[11], the Court had already decided that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor
On the argument that respondent did not prove or establish damages entitling her to be represented by private prosecutors who were supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, the same is not necessary and without basis. Thus:
“When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the private prosecutors.”
[1] Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 513, citing U.S. vs. Estraña, 16 Phil. 520 (1910) and Padua vs. Paz, A.M. No. P-00-1445, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 21, cited in Yu v. Lim, G.R. no. 182291, September 22, 2010
[2] Yu v. Lim, G.R. no. 182291, September 22, 2010; Saulo v. People, G.R. No. 242900, June 8, 2020
[3] Saulo v. People, G.R. No. 242900, June 8, 2020
[4] ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON H. MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S. MONFORT, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR OF CADIZ CITY, Respondents., G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007
[5] Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 65006, October 31, 1990, cited in Monfort v. Salvatierra, et al, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007
[6] in Monfort v. Salvatierra, et al, G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007
[7] Yu v. Lim, G.R. no. 182291, September 22, 2010
[8] Choa v. People and Choa, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003
[9] Choa v. People and Choa, G.R. No. 142011, March 14, 2003
[10] G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013
[11] 94 Phil. 197 (1953)